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INTRODUCTION 
On April 30, 2009, Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri pled guilty to the charge of 
conspiracy to provide material support to al-Qaeda, a banned Foreign Terrorist 
Organization (FTO), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (“§ 2339B”).1 The case of 
al-Marri, who previously had been held for nearly six years in isolation at a military 
brig in Charleston, South Carolina, as an enemy combatant, generated significant 
litigation regarding the government’s power to detain individuals so designated 
who were apprehended in the United States.2 While the Supreme Court was set to 
hear argument on the extent of its enemy combatant power, the government 
decided to transfer al-Marri’s case to a federal court in Illinois, where he was 
indicted and ultimately pled guilty to the material support charge noted above.3 The 
guilty plea outlines the role he played in al-Qaeda, his relationship with Khalid 
Sheikh Mohammed, and his travel to the United States for purposes related to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 *  Assistant Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law. Many thanks to 
Tommy Crocker, Lisa Eichhorn, Susan Kuo, and Sudha Setty for their comments on earlier 
drafts of this paper. Thanks to Wafa Abu-Salim for excellent research assistance. Versions of 
this paper were presented at the University of Kansas School of Law, the University of South 
Carolina School of Law, and Yale Law School’s Middle East Legal Forum. As an assistant 
federal public defender in the Office of the Federal Public Defender for the Middle District 
of Florida, the author was counsel to Hatim Fariz, one of the defendants in United States v. 
Al-Arian, discussed infra.  
 1.  John Schwartz, Plea Agreement Reached with Agent for Al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 1, 2009, at A16. 
 2.  See Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008); Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 
F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 3.  John Schwartz, Admitted Qaeda Agent Receives Prison Sentence, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
30, 2009, at A22. 
544 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 86:543 
 
furthering the organization’s goals.4 Even though al-Marri’s plea exposed him to 
the maximum possible sentence allowed under § 2339B, fifteen years in prison, he 
was given credit for his eight years in custody, and sentenced to a little over eight 
years imprisonment.5 
Approximately one month later, five defendants convicted of multiple counts of 
violating § 2339B and related crimes stemming from their roles as officers in the 
Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) received their sentences 
in the federal courthouse in Dallas.6 The sentences ranged from fifteen years in 
prison on the low end to sixty-five years for Shukri Abu Baker, the former CEO of 
HLF, and Ghassan Elashi, the former chairman of its board.7 Despite the serious 
and lengthy nature of the prison terms handed down, the government conceded that 
the defendants were not in any way connected to an act of violence, and that HLF 
had provided genuine humanitarian aid to charitable organizations, known as zakat 
committees, lawfully operating in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.8 The 
government’s theory was that the zakat committees were controlled by Hamas, a 
banned FTO, that used the humanitarian aid to gain support for its agenda among 
the Palestinian people.9 
The above two cases are examples of the extremely wide range of activities that 
can lead to a defendant’s conviction for having provided material support to a 
terrorist organization, and of the sometimes counterintuitive nature of that 
sentencing.10 Since September 11, 2001, the chief statute for charging terrorism 
suspects in federal court has been § 2339B,11 which criminalizes material support 
of terrorist groups.12 Where previous terrorism prosecutions focused on punishing 
offenders for acts of violence that had already occurred, the new focus on material 
                                                                                                                 
 
 4.  Plea Agreement and Stipulation of Facts at 9–17, United States v. al-Marri, No. 09-
CR-10030 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2009) (guilty plea). 
 5.  Schwartz, supra note 3. 
 6.  Press Release, Federal Bureau of Investigation—Dallas, Department of Justice 
Press Release, Federal Judge Hands Down Sentences in Holy Land Foundation Case (May 
27, 2009), available at http://dallas.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/dl052709.htm. The 
primary difference in the length of the sentences received by the HLF defendants and that of 
al-Marri apparently stemmed from the number of counts on which the defendants were 
convicted. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Leslie Eaton, Prosecutors Say a Charity Aided Terrorists Indirectly, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 18, 2007, at A20. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  See Jason Trahan, 5 Decry Prison Terms in Holy Land Foundation Case, DALL. 
MORNING NEWS, May 28, 2009 (State and Regional News). In response to defense counsel in 
HLF raising the issue of the sentence handed down in the al-Marri case, “[Federal District 
Judge Jorge A.] Solis retorted that ‘raising millions of dollars to fund terrorism, that’s a 
different situation.’ He said that al-Marri is an example of someone who wanted to ‘commit 
“an” act of terrorism, as bad as that is. This is support over years.’” Id. 
 11.  See DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERROR 75–76 (2003) (calling § 2339B “the centerpiece of the 
Justice Department’s criminal war on terrorism”); DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, 
LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA IS LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR 49–50 (2007). 
 12.  18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006). 
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support-type prosecutions was engineered to aid in preventing terrorism activity 
from taking place in the future.13 The so-called prevention paradigm of terrorism 
enforcement has been criticized as being ineffective in curtailing terrorism.14 What 
has been left largely unexplored is what § 2339B litigation reveals about the United 
States’ position on political violence and the groups that carry it out. Specifically, 
what these prosecutions demonstrate is a divergence between terrorism 
enforcement as a matter of direct national security, that is, focused on groups that 
engage in violence against the United States, its personnel, and property, whether at 
home or abroad, and terrorism enforcement as a kind of foreign policy tool, that is, 
geared at prosecuting individuals connected to organizations targeting foreign 
individuals and entities. In the former instance, where a prosecution directly alleges 
that the defendant engaged in violent activity, prosecutions are more 
straightforward. When there is little or no link between the defendant and the 
violent acts of an organization with which he has affiliated himself, however, the 
basis of a prosecution is on shakier ground. In such a situation, the further the 
relationship is from violence, the greater the possibility that the prosecution will be 
transformed into a debate on foreign policy, despite efforts by the courts to limit 
defendants’ ability to engage in such arguments. 
Although the federal courts have consistently narrowed the framework in which 
a criminal defendant accused of engaging in or supporting terrorism can make 
arguments rooted in political or religious belief, the nature and conduct of terrorism 
prosecutions themselves have the potential to make such arguments relevant 
nonetheless.15 A review of the process by which groups are designated as FTOs 
reveals that the government has taken a de facto position that all political violence 
perpetrated by nonstate actors is terrorism.16 There are currently no standards or 
guidelines defining when nonstate political violence can be justified or even 
excused.17 Further, § 2339B prosecutions operate under the theory that “money is 
fungible,” and that support sent to terrorist groups for charitable purposes frees up 
money for violence.18 This theory, when coupled with the current vagueness of the 
FTO designation process, has profound implications for the Fifth Amendment due 
process rights of defendants charged under the statute.19 
This Article advances two main recommendations. First, the government should 
have to articulate when and under what conditions, if any, nonstate groups might be 
allowed to engage in violence. Such an explicit standard would provide a more 
legitimate legal basis for prosecutions of individuals charged with supporting FTOs 
and prevent such prosecutions from selective and inappropriate attempts to create 
or assert foreign policy. Second, the “money is fungible” theory should be 
subjected to a more extensive review. While the theory seems to make sense on an 
abstract level, the prosecution should have to make a specific showing that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 13.  Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the 
Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 28–30 (2005). 
 14.  See generally COLE & LOBEL, supra note 11. 
 15.  See infra Part I. 
 16.  See infra Part II. 
 17.  See infra Part II. 
 18.  See infra Part III.D. 
 19.  See infra Part III.D.  
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humanitarian support to a given organization does in fact facilitate violence. This 
showing is necessary in cases where the government never contends that the 
defendant planned or carried out any violent activity. Otherwise, the courtroom 
risks being turned into a forum in which to have a foreign policy debate and 
unjustly convict § 2339B defendants. 
Part I of this Article provides a historical overview of modern terrorism 
prosecutions prior to September 11, 2001. Part II discusses the FTO designation 
process, the foreign policy considerations behind it, and how it essentially defines 
terrorism as all nonstate political violence. Part III examines the Fifth 
Amendment’s due process personal-guilt standards in light of the HLF prosecution 
and explains how far the “money is fungible” theory can take a prosecution. 
I. THE PRE-9/11 TERRORISM PROSECUTION—EXAMPLES AND TRENDS 
As with a great number of nations in the modern world, the United States has 
grappled both directly and indirectly with the phenomenon of subnational groups 
engaging in violence against civilian and military targets to achieve a change in 
policy of a particular government. Prior to 9/11, the risks to U.S. citizens or 
interests stemming from international terrorism were not perceived to be on a grand 
scale.20 However, the federal courts did have occasion to issue several rulings of 
note regarding what has come to be called “international terrorism,” provided there 
was a significant enough link to the United States to justify criminal prosecution. A 
number of these decisions are discussed below and serve to illustrate the courts’ 
willingness to expand the law in various directions to combat what is regarded as 
abhorrent and unjustified behavior. Prerequisites for prosecution were allegations 
of violent activity (or plans to engage in such activity) on the part of the defendant 
and a nexus to the United States, more often than not through an American victim. 
As shown below, in such situations, courts refused to allow legal challenges to 
criminal charges rooted in political arguments. 
A. United States v. Yunis 
1. Facts 
In June 1985, Fawaz Yunis, a Lebanese national and member of the Shiite 
militia Amal, played the lead role in hijacking a Jordanian passenger aircraft and all 
those onboard, including several American citizens, from the Beirut airport.21 After 
                                                                                                                 
 
 20.  See, e.g., PHILIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM, AND SECURITY: WINNING 
WITHOUT WAR 4 (2003). 
 21.  United States v. Yunis (Yunis I), 859 F.2d 953, 955–56 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The goal 
of the hijackers was to fly to Tunisia in the hopes of securing a meeting with representatives 
of the Arab League to demand that all Palestinians be removed from Lebanon. Id. at 955. 
Amal, which was loyal to Syria during the entirety of the Lebanese civil war, laid siege to 
several Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon between 1985 and 1987, an event referred to 
as the “War of the Camps,” in an attempt to drive out Palestinian forces loyal to then-PLO 
Chairman Yasser Arafat. See generally ROBERT FISK, PITY THE NATION: THE ABDUCTION OF 
LEBANON (Thunder’s Mouth Press/Nation Books 2002) (1990). 
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failing to achieve their objectives, Yunis and the other members of the hijacking 
team eventually released the passengers unharmed after a series of trips around the 
Mediterranean region, and then escaped back into Beirut after blowing up the 
empty aircraft.22 In September 1987, Yunis was lured by an informant working 
with the FBI from Lebanon to a drug deal in international waters off the coast of 
Cyprus, where he was promptly arrested and returned to the United States.23 Not 
surprisingly, given the unorthodox nature of his capture, Yunis’s case generated 
several significant decisions by the D.C. Circuit.24 
The implications of the decisions in Yunis reflect a larger policy perspective in 
that the government displayed an ambitious willingness to capture a hijacker 
abroad and return him to the United States to stand trial, even where no one was 
hurt during the hijacking, and where the Amal militia was not a party in conflict 
with the United States, its allegiance to Syria notwithstanding. Yunis’s capture 
came in the aftermath of the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut in April 
1983,25 the attack on the Marine barracks in October 1983,26 the March 1984 
abduction of the CIA station chief for Beirut,27 the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 
and the killing of a Navy serviceman onboard in June 1985,28 as well as various 
other kidnappings of American nationals in Lebanon during that time period. 
Although Amal was not responsible for any of the above incidents, in light of this 
background, it is perhaps unsurprising that the D.C. Circuit signaled its acceptance 
of the government’s arguments to a large degree and allowed Yunis to be 
prosecuted and ultimately convicted for his role in the hijacking. As an initial 
matter, the court overturned the district court’s suppression of his confession to the 
FBI, which he made over several sessions after he had received his Miranda 
warnings but while he was being transported by ship to the United States and in a 
weakened physical state due to injuries he suffered during his capture.29 
2. Jurisdictional Arguments and International Law 
The third ruling30 of the D.C. Circuit in Yunis spelled out the role that customary 
international law plays when it conflicts with domestic law. With regard to the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 22.  Yunis I, 859 F.2d at 955. 
 23.  Id. Apparently, the CIA also played a role in Yunis’s arrest, as reported by former 
CIA case officers with knowledge of the incident. See ROBERT BAER, SLEEPING WITH THE 
DEVIL: HOW WASHINGTON SOLD OUR SOUL FOR SAUDI CRUDE 119–22 (2004) (also 
discussing the use of a man indicted for several murders in Lebanon as the informant in the 
case, as well as describing governmental pressure to capture Yunis so as to demonstrate 
some success in apprehending and trying terrorists); MELISSA BOYLE MAHLE, DENIAL AND 
DECEPTION: AN INSIDER’S VIEW OF THE CIA FROM IRAN-CONTRA TO 9/11, at 202 (2005). 
 24.  See Yunis I, 859 F.2d 953; infra note 30.  
 25.  See FISK, supra note 21, at 478–80. 
 26.  See id. at 511–22. 
 27.  See id. at 565. 
 28.  See id. at 605–09. 
 29.  Yunis I, 859 F.2d at 969–70 (“The interrogation of Yunis hardly qualifies as a 
model for law enforcement behavior.”). 
 30.  United States v. Yunis (Yunis III), 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991). In its second 
decision, the court reversed another of the district court’s rulings that Yunis was entitled to 
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charges against him under the Hostage Taking Act,31 Yunis argued, inter alia, that 
his prosecution was not allowed by the universal32 and passive personal33 principles 
of jurisdiction under customary international law.34 The court made short work of 
Yunis’s argument on both fronts, even though it recognized that his arguments 
could have merit under international law, and held that when “the statute in 
question reflects an unmistakable congressional intent, consistent with treaty 
obligations of the United States, to authorize prosecution of those who take 
American hostages abroad no matter where the offense occurs or where the 
offender is found,” then customary international law must take a back seat to 
domestic law.35 
By way of contrast, the court ruled that international law allowed for jurisdiction 
over Yunis’s prosecution under the relevant provision of the Antihijacking Act,36 
which codified in domestic law the Hague Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (“Hague Convention”).37 It held that the nature of 
Yunis’s presence in the United States rendered him “found in the United States” for 
purposes of the Antihijacking Act, regardless of its involuntariness, since both the 
Hague Convention and Congress were silent on the issue of how a hijacker came 
into a state’s custody, leading the court to conclude that it was a nonissue.38 To 
underscore the court’s position on the matter, it invoked international law to make 
its point: “Aircraft hijacking may well be one of the few crimes so clearly 
condemned under the law of nations that states may assert universal jurisdiction to 
bring offenders to justice, even when the state has no territorial connection to the 
hijacking and its citizens are not involved.”39  
                                                                                                                 
the transcripts of his conversations with the government’s informant, and held that those 
conversations, as classified information, were not discoverable under the Classified 
Information Procedures Act (CIPA), since they were neither helpful nor relevant to the 
defense. See United States v. Yunis (Yunis II), 867 F.2d 617, 623–26 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 31.  18 U.S.C. § 1203 (2006).  
 32.  Yunis III, 924 F.2d at 1091 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 404, 423). The universal principle allows for 
jurisdiction over certain acts, regardless of their relation to the prosecuting state, where they 
are particularly grave, so as to be “of universal concern,” and Yunis took the position that 
hostage taking was not recognized as such. Id. 
 33.  Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 402). The passive personal principle allows for jurisdiction over non-nationals for 
acts committed extraterritorially against a state’s nationals where the state has a strong 
interest in the crime. Referring to customary international law, Yunis noted that jurisdiction 
under the passive personal principle could lie only in the hostage-taking context if he had 
specifically targeted the Americans onboard the hijacked plane because of their nationality. 
Id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  49 U.S.C. § 46502(b) (2006) (formerly 49 U.S.C. App. § 1472(n)). 
 37.  Yunis III, 924 F.2d at 1092. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. (citations omitted). 
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3. Lawful Combatants Test 
Yunis also attempted to argue that, as a member of a military organization, he 
was merely carrying out orders, which, he posited, was an affirmative defense to 
the charges against him, unless he knew the orders were illegal.40 While the parties 
agreed on the elements of this affirmative defense, the district court ruled that Amal 
could be deemed a military organization only “if the group has a hierarchical 
command structure and ‘[c]onducts its operations in accordance with the laws and 
customs of war,’ and if its members have a uniform and carry arms openly.”41 The 
court noted that this definition was drawn from international law, which in this case 
stemmed from the United States’ treaty obligations as a signatory under both the 
Geneva and Hague (IV) Conventions, and that the jury instructions properly 
defined a military organization.42 Inevitably, like the court in Yunis, the later courts 
hearing prosecutions of nonstate militia members have usually held the lawful 
combatant defense inapplicable,43 since members of nonstate militias, if they did 
not wear uniforms and engaged in activity that could or did in fact target civilians, 
could not be regarded as lawful combatants, regardless of their motivation and 
perceived justness of their cause.44 
The Yunis holdings thus serve as a strong jurisprudential basis for criminal 
prosecutions of nonstate actors engaged in violent activities abroad that touch upon 
America and its citizens, regardless of whether the nonstate actors intended to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 40.  Id. at 1097–99. 
 41.  Id. at 1097 (alteration in original) (quoting the district court’s jury instructions). 
 42.  Id. at 1098. Incidentally, the standards for determining whether an individual is part 
of a military organization are the same as those the federal courts have been using with more 
frequency since 9/11 to determine whether individuals charged with terrorism-related 
offenses could avail themselves of the protection of lawful combatant status. See, e.g., 
United States v. Pineda, No. CR. 04-232(TFH), 2006 WL 785287, at *2–5 (D.D.C. Mar. 28, 
2006) (denying lawful combatant immunity to defendant based on membership in the FARC, 
a banned terrorist organization); United States v. Arnaout, 236 F. Supp. 2d 916, 917–18 
(N.D. Ill. 2003) (finding that members of various Muslim militias in Bosnia and Chechnya 
could not be construed as lawful combatants based on the facts in the record); United States 
v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 556–58 (E.D. Va. 2002) (deciding the case of an American 
citizen charged with fighting with the Taliban). 
 43.  See supra note 42. 
 44.  This holding is not surprising, in light of the United States’ position on the status of 
members of nonstate militias under international humanitarian law. See, e.g., George H. 
Aldrich, Prospects for United States Ratification of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 3–10 (1991) (discussing the reasons behind the 
United States’ refusal to ratify the First Geneva Protocol, especially in light of the Reagan 
administration’s view that the text served as a significant victory for the PLO); Reuven 
Young, Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept in International 
Law and Its Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation, 29 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 23, 93–95 (2006) (noting the United States’ position on military targets is at odds with 
international law principles generally excluding military targets as a victim of terrorism); see 
also Gerald L. Neuman, Humanitarian Law and Counter-Terrorist Force, 14 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 283, 285 n.5 (2003) (noting the United States’ objection to the First Geneva Protocol’s 
prohibition on reprisals against the civilian populations of an enemy country). 
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single out American targets. In this case, the D.C. Circuit, understandably, allowed 
the government to prosecute the hijackers of an international civilian airliner with 
passengers of various nationalities—including Americans—aboard, and paid no 
attention to the motivations of the hijackers. In Yunis, that motivation was to 
persuade the Arab League to remove the Palestinians from Lebanon. The court’s 
position was a clear indication that certain violent activity renders moot the fact 
that the United States and its citizens were not purposefully targeted.45 
B. United States v. Rezaq  
1. Facts 
In United States v. Rezaq,46 the D.C. Circuit again had occasion to examine the 
prosecution of an individual who had hijacked an international flight. In November 
1985, Rezaq, a “Palestinian, [who] was, at the time of the hijacking, a member of a 
Palestinian terrorist organization,” hijacked an Air Egypt flight in Athens and had it 
diverted to Malta.47 While there, he released a number of passengers but singled out 
the Americans and Israelis, and when his demands were not met by the Maltese 
authorities, he shot two Americans, killing one, and three Israelis, also killing 
one.48 Egyptian commandos later stormed the plane in a botched raid that resulted 
in the deaths of fifty-seven passengers due to the commandos’ own incompetence.49 
After his capture, Rezaq pled guilty to murder, attempted murder, and hostage 
taking and was sentenced to twenty-five years, of which he served only seven and 
was subsequently released by the Maltese authorities.50 After he made his way to 
Nigeria, the authorities there turned him over to the FBI, which brought him to the 
United States, where he was charged with one count of violating the Antihijacking 
Act under 49 U.S.C. App. § 1472(n).51 He went to trial and was found guilty.52 
2. Jurisdictional Arguments and International Law 
The D.C. Circuit began its analysis by finding that double jeopardy did not bar 
Rezaq’s sequential prosecution in the United States under the dual-sovereignty 
theory, and, in any event, the charge of air piracy in the United States carried 
different elements than those of the crimes of murder, attempted murder, and 
hostage taking in Malta.53 It further held that the Hague Convention did not require 
                                                                                                                 
 
 45.  See Yunis III, 924 F. 2d at 1091.  
 46.  134 F.3d 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 47.  Id. at 1126. 
 48.  Id.  
 49.  Id.  
 50.  Id. (pointing out that the reason for Rezaq’s release so early into his sentence was 
unclear). 
 51.  Id. at 1126–27. On July 5, 1994, 49 U.S.C. App. § 1472(n) was recodified in Title 
49 by Public Law No. 103-272, § 1(e), 108 Stat. 1240-45, and can now be found at 49 
U.S.C. § 46502(b). 
 52.  Rezaq, 134 F.3d at 1127. 
 53.  Id. at 1128–30. 
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a more stringent double jeopardy test than that required by U.S. law.54 The court 
also rejected Rezaq’s argument that the government had manufactured jurisdiction 
by bringing him to the United States against his will, holding that Rezaq was 
“afterward found in the United States” as per § 1472(n) and, as such, could be 
prosecuted under the Antihijacking Act, a position not limited or contravened by 
the Hague Convention.55 In so holding, the court relied to a large degree on Yunis 
III and did not credit Rezaq’s argument that the Yunis situation was different since 
Yunis had been charged with violating the Antihijacking Act only after being 
present in the United States, whereas Rezaq had been brought to the United States 
for the sole purpose of being prosecuted under § 1472(n).56 The final procedural 
issue decided by the court stemmed from Rezaq’s challenge to the district court’s 
application of the “death results”57 provision of § 1472(n) against him under both 
the Hague Convention and customary international law.58 It found no restriction on 
the application of this provision under the Hague Convention and ruled that 
customary international law would allow for jurisdiction on the “death results” 
provision based on the passive personal principle, since Rezaq had killed an 
American during the hijacking.59 
3. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Defense Rooted in the Larger Political Context 
With respect to Rezaq’s remaining arguments, the most pertinent to this Article 
concerns the admission into evidence of the fifty-seven deaths caused by the 
storming of the hijacked plane by Egyptian security forces. Rezaq had put forth an 
insanity defense that was rooted in his suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD) when he carried out the hijacking, a condition developed through 
his childhood in a Palestinian refugee camp in Jordan, “witnessing the killing of 
hundreds of refugees by Israeli forces in Beirut in 1982; witnessing the killings of 
the populations of entire villages; and nearly being killed in a car bombing.”60 The 
district court allowed the government to present evidence of the fifty-seven deaths 
to the jury, over Rezaq’s Federal Rule of Evidence 403 objection, since the 
government, on cross-examination of his expert witnesses, could contend in good 
faith that the storming of the plane and its aftermath were what caused the PTSD.61 
Both the district court and the D.C. Circuit therefore did not allow Rezaq, even 
indirectly, to ground his defense in a larger political context, one that encompasses 
the status of Palestinian refugees in Jordan, the Israeli invasions of Lebanon in 
1978 and 1982, and other random violence committed by unnamed groups in the 
time period of the Lebanese Civil War. Since the crime was heinous and an 
American had been murdered, the fact that the episode ended in further tragedy 
                                                                                                                 
 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. at 1130–32. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  This part of the statute “requir[es] the imposition of the death sentence or of life 
imprisonment in cases in which death results.” Id. at 1132. 
 58.  Id. at 1132–33. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. at 1126. 
 61.  Id. at 1138–39. 
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could be employed to rebut an attempt to establish a defense that, at heart, strove to 
show that Rezaq was not acting in a vacuum. Inevitably, however, defenses rooted 
in the personal or larger historical backgrounds of an individual’s role in a foreign 
conflict involving war and occupation are found to be either irrelevant or subject to 
devastating impeachment, especially when a United States citizen has been killed 
in an airplane hijacking.62 This is hardly surprising and certainly not illegitimate, 
given the extremely violent nature of the crime with which Rezaq was charged and 
ultimately convicted. 
C. International Terrorism in the United States—The Rahman Case 
1. Islamic Law and Expert Testimony 
As the issue of international terrorism came to the United States, the patterns of 
courts restricting the possibility of political arguments continued, and even 
expanded. With the advent of prosecutions rooted in crimes committed by foreign 
Islamists,63 courts were confronted with defenses rooted in Islamic law. Indeed, in 
United States v. Rahman,64 the Second Circuit, in upholding the convictions of 
Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman (the “Blind Sheikh”) and his associates for their roles 
in the plot to blow up various landmarks around the New York metropolitan area as 
well as assassinate the president of Egypt, issued a holding rejecting defenses 
rooted in the wider context of both Islamic law and perceived oppression or 
injustice. Abdel Rahman had sought the benefit of expert testimony under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 70265 to argue that any advice he might have given to his 
codefendants, as members of his congregation, was legal under Islamic law, and 
that as a religious leader, he was duty-bound to offer such advice.66 The court 
                                                                                                                 
 
 62.  The fact pattern of Rezaq has now been repeated in more than one instance, as the 
government has prosecuted individuals convicted and imprisoned abroad for extraterritorial 
hijacking offenses on several occasions, even going so far as to seek the death penalty 
against a Palestinian who had previously served fifteen years in a Pakistani prison. See 
United States v. Safarini, 257 F. Supp. 2d 191, 193 (D.D.C. 2003) (barring the government 
from seeking the death penalty under the Federal Death Penalty Act as in violation of 
retroactivity principles and the Ex Post Facto Clause); see also United States v. Rashed, 234 
F.3d 1280, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (denying double-jeopardy challenge of Palestinian hijacker 
previously convicted and imprisoned in Greece). 
 63.  The attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 produced the first of these 
prosecutions. See United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 64.  189 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1999). Incidentally, the correct last name of the named 
defendant is Abdel Rahman, although it is not uncommon to see courts make this basic 
mistake in transliterating Arabic names. See, e.g., United States v. Sattar, 314 F. Supp. 2d 
279 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (the named defendant’s correct name is in fact Abdel Sattar). 
 65.  FED. R. EVID. 702 (2009) (“If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may 
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon 
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, 
and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.”). 
 66.  Rahman, 189 F.3d at 134–38. Following 9/11, at least one individual has been 
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rejected testimony under that theory, in addition to testimony under an Islamic 
customary argument that as a Muslim who was a guest of a non-Muslim country, 
Abdel Rahman could not advocate violence against the United States, explaining 
that: 
 The issue was whether the evidence showed that Abdel Rahman, with 
the requisite criminal intent, conspired to wage war on the United 
States through acts of terrorism or solicited others to commit crimes of 
violence. The question whether such acts on his part would have been 
condoned or forbidden by Islamic law could lead to an evidentiary 
dispute about Islamic law that would have little likelihood of 
illuminating whether he committed the forbidden acts of terrorism.67 
The court further ruled that testimony as to what Abdel Rahman’s thoughts and 
intentions were when he issued fatwas on the concept of jihad would have been an 
impermissible attempt to have expert witnesses testify in his place.68 Testimony 
regarding the human rights situation in Egypt, however horrible it may be, was also 
excluded as irrelevant to the issue of whether Abdel Rahman committed the acts 
with which he was charged.69 Finally, his attempt to have an expert witness testify 
that terrorism against the United States would harm his agenda of changing the 
United States’ relationship with the government of Egypt was rejected because the 
court held that the testimony would be speculative and would again act as an 
improper substitute for Abdel Rahman’s own testimony.70 
It is difficult to find fault with the reasoning of Rahman on the above points of 
law as they apply to that particular set of facts. The charges all related to various 
plots and conspiracies to engage in violent behavior in the United States, and, even 
assuming that everything Abdel Rahman said was permitted by Islamic law,71 
                                                                                                                 
convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for advocating that, under Islamic law, his 
followers had a duty to fight the United States and its forces in Afghanistan. See Elisa F. 
Kantor, Note, New Threats, Old Problems: Adhering to Brandenburg’s Imminence 
Requirement in Terrorism Prosecutions, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 752, 770–75 (2008) 
(discussing the al-Timimi prosecution); Jerry Markon, Muslim Leader Is Found Guilty; 
Fairfax Man Urged Followers to Train for Violent Jihad, WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 2005, at A1. 
 67.  Rahman, 189 F.3d at 136. The court rejected Abdel Rahman’s First Amendment 
challenges to the seditious conspiracy charges on similar grounds. See id. at 114–16. 
 68.  Id. at 136–37 (noting that testimony on several discrete issues, such as the literal 
meaning of and concept behind the words “jihad” or “fatwa,” for example, would have been 
relevant). 
 69.  Id. at 137–38. 
 70.  Id. Testimony from the same proposed expert that Abdel Rahman’s codefendants 
were not technically capable of carrying out the bombing of the World Trade Center was 
also rejected as speculative. Id. at 138. 
 71.  Attempting to frame the issue in the guise of Islamic law is also problematic, given 
the nebulous nature of that term. There are four main schools of Islamic law in Sunni Islam 
alone, each of which contain their own substrands and varying interpretations, and since 
none of these schools are rigidly constrained by a central authority, any individual 
religiously qualified to issue a fatwa (a mufti) can expound on any issue they might be asked 
to decide. See M. Cherif Bassiouni & Gamal M. Badr, The Shari’ah: Sources, Interpretation, 
and Rule-Making, 1 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 135, 161–62, 169–71, 176 (2002). 
Allowing testimony on this point would have necessitated, for example, the unwieldy step of 
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federal courts are loath to let such a defense stand in the way of conviction when 
violence in this country is the intended objective of a conspiracy. It is also hard to 
see how the human rights situation in Egypt was relevant to the charged 
conspiracies, although there might be room to argue that such information could 
become relevant under a perceived self-defense theory if the only crimes charged 
related to a conspiracy to assassinate the Egyptian president, but even then the 
testimony may be irrelevant or of such little probative value as to be excluded. In 
short, the conclusion here is that expert testimony regarding the larger political 
context of an individual’s motivations or intentions will be excluded in a terrorism 
case when the threat of violence in the United States is at the heart of the 
government’s allegations. In Rahman, that context was the defendant’s conflict 
with the Egyptian government and the United States’ support of that government.  
2. Allegations of Judicial Bias  
Another example of a defendant trying to interject a wider political context into 
a case occurred when counsel for Ibrahim El-Gabrowny, one of Abdel Rahman’s 
codefendants, moved to recuse then–District Judge Michael Mukasey on the basis 
of bias, which was allegedly rooted in the judge’s adherence to the tenets of 
Orthodox Judaism and Zionism.72 The thrust of the motion was that, as the 
government had argued that El-Gabrowny and his codefendants undertook the acts 
charged in the indictment in opposition to the United States’ relationship with 
Israel, any bias in favor of Israel was unfairly prejudicial to him.73 The motion also 
requested that Judge Mukasey disclose his and his family’s relationships with the 
state of Israel as evidence of his Zionist beliefs.74 Judge Mukasey denied the 
motion on the basis, inter alia, that Israel had no relationship to any of the counts 
against the defendants, which all involved plots and conspiracies to attack targets 
primarily in the United States.75 He also refused to answer any questions about his 
or his family’s relationship to Israel on the basis that such information was 
irrelevant, and that to answer the questions on that topic would concede the 
relevance of the argument, which he had already rejected.76 
Even though the motion aimed at securing a purportedly less biased judge on the 
basis of the larger political issues at play in the case, the ruling was unsurprising. 
At the outset, any reference to the judge’s religion as a basis for bias was clearly 
improper, since tangential theories about a clash of religions do not constitute a real 
defense to allegations of a conspiracy to attack targets in the United States, as 
                                                                                                                 
the government’s calling its own expert in Islamic law to demonstrate possibly that Abdel 
Rahman’s theories could be deemed illegal under other schools of Islamic law or even under 
other substrands of the same school. 
 72.  United States v. El-Gabrowny, 844 F. Supp. 955, 957–62 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
 73.  See id. at 957. 
 74.  Id. at 958. 
 75.  Id. at 961 (“Even if those who are charged with committing and planning such acts 
are alleged to have done so in part because they oppose United States support for the policies 
or the existence of the State of Israel, it is impossible to imagine any effect on Israel from the 
outcome of this case, whatever it may be, that can be described by a rational person as 
‘substantial.’” (citations omitted)). 
 76.  Id. at 962. 
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pointed out by Judge Mukasey in his opinion.77 Regardless of the thrust of the 
motion, however, in this case there was no factual or legal basis to use a larger 
political context as grounds for relief. 
 
*** 
 
The pre-9/11 terrorism prosecution centered on some act of violence and a link 
to the United States; arguments that such violence could be justified or excused on 
religious or political grounds were unavailing in the eyes of the federal courts 
adjudicating the cases.78 Jurisdictional arguments that the United States should not 
try individuals who committed their crimes abroad were rejected as well.79 When 
the potentially complicating factor of religious law was involved, the courts could 
take refuge in the notion that the authenticity of religious belief did not render 
violence acceptable.80 Simply stated, the message seemed to be that there was no 
compelling legal reason to allow hijackers and international terrorists who used 
violence to escape prosecution, provided their acts of violence had links to the 
United States.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 77.  Id. at 961–62. The only link to Israel was that several of the charges in the case 
stemmed from the killing of Meir Kahane, the founder of the militant Jewish Defense 
League and a former member of the Israeli Knesset. See United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 
88, 103, 105 (2d Cir. 1999). The motion appeared to be an attempt by counsel for El-
Gabrowny to frame the allegations against him in a political context, namely one in which he 
was motivated by what he perceived as unjust policies of the United States in support of 
Israel. See, e.g., United States v. Khalil, 214 F.3d 111, 116–117 (2d Cir. 2000) (upholding 
conviction and sentence of defendant convicted of plotting to bomb targets in the United 
States to punish it for its policies in favor of Israel). Perhaps the motion, had it succeeded, 
would have been followed by attempts to disqualify jurors on the basis of whether or not 
they were Zionists, thus giving the defense an advantage in the voir dire process. In any 
event, the motion had the effect of unnerving Judge Mukasey, who accused El-Gabrowny’s 
counsel of engaging in a pattern of accusing judges of this type of bias without foundation. 
El-Gabrowny, 844 F. Supp. at 962 n.4. The district court referred to the comments made by 
the late William Kunstler, who served as counsel for El-Gabrowny, after the sentence 
handed down by Judge Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York to Khaled El-Jassem, 
a Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) official convicted of attempting to set off three 
car bombs in New York City in 1973 against Israeli targets. United States v. El-Jassem, 819 
F. Supp. 116 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). Specifically, in his representation of El-Jassem, Kunstler 
accused Judge Weinstein of being a Zionist and showing a lack of compassion for 
defendants connected to the PLO after he sentenced El-Jassem to three consecutive, rather 
than concurrent, ten-year terms. See id. However, comments by counsel to the press after a 
major ruling like the issuance of a sentence are not the same as a recusal motion on the 
record. Further, El-Gabrowny’s motion, which implicitly framed the issues in his case as 
rooted in some sort of civilizational war between Islam and Judaism, was particularly easy to 
dismiss. 
 78.  See supra Part I. 
 79.  See supra Part I.A. 
 80.  See supra Part I.C. 
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II. POST-9/11 PROSECUTIONS—§ 2339B AND THE  
GREATER POLITICAL CONTEXT 
After 9/11, § 2339B81 emerged as the statute most utilized by the government in 
terrorism prosecutions.82 Where previously international terrorism prosecutions in 
federal court sounded in statutes that criminalized concrete violent activity with an 
American nexus, § 2339B now permitted the government to criminalize activity not 
directly related to the commission of a violent act.83 At every stage, the ban on 
material support has implicated matters of foreign policy, and courts have resisted, 
to the extent possible, allowing the groups and individuals targeted by its 
provisions from litigating whether the conduct criminalized actually harms United 
States foreign policy goals.  
A. Background to § 2339B’s Passage 
What became § 2339B was part of a bill known as the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) passed by Congress and signed into law by 
President Clinton in April 1996.84 The substance of this provision was debated in 
Congress for several years and was designed to close a loophole supposedly left 
open by 18 U.S.C. § 2339A.85 In essence, the provision criminalized material 
support in aid of several enumerated crimes of violence, but did not deal with the 
purportedly pressing problem of foreign terrorist groups raising money in the 
United States by way of appeals to humanitarian aid.86 Taken together, the majority 
                                                                                                                 
 
 81.  18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006) (“Whoever knowingly provides material support or 
resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, and, if the death of any person 
results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life.”). 
 82.  See COLE & LOBEL, supra note 11, at 49; COLE, supra note 11, at 75 (calling 
§ 2339B “the centerpiece of the Justice Department’s criminal war on terrorism”). 
 83.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (“Whoever knowingly provides material support or 
resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, and, if the death of any person 
results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life. To violate this paragraph, a 
person must have knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist organization (as 
defined in subsection (g)(6)), that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist 
activity (as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act), or that 
the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism (as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the 
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989).”). 
 84.  Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 
Stat. 1214. 
 85.  18 U.S.C. § 2339A defines material support or resources as:  
[A]ny property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or 
monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, 
training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or 
identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal 
substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or include 
oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials. 
 86.  See H.R. REP. 104-383, at 43 (1995) (Congress was concerned that groups were 
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of post-9/11 terrorism prosecutions sound in whole or in part in allegations of 
illegal material support, suggesting that the government is using these statutes “as 
catch-all offenses that can be invoked in widely varying situations where 
individuals engage in conduct that may contribute in some way to the commission 
of terrorist offenses” and also as “a basis for early intervention, a kind of criminal 
early-warning and preventive-enforcement device designed to nip the risk of 
terrorist activity in the bud.”87 
The passage of the law came at a time when President Clinton had exercised his 
right under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) in January 
1995, by way of an executive order to designate as Specially Designated Terrorists 
(SDTs) certain groups and individuals seriously disrupting the Middle East peace 
process in contravention of U.S. national interests.88 The order froze assets held by 
the SDTs in the United States, forbade any dealings in the assets of an SDT, and 
outlawed the giving or receiving of funds, goods, and services that benefited an 
SDT.89 
On the domestic front, the April 1995 Oklahoma City bombing spurred the 
passage of AEDPA, giving it greater urgency and relevance, even though the 
material support ban was set to apply only to foreign terrorist groups.90 With 
respect to events occurring abroad, the bill was signed into law on the heels of a 
series of suicide bombing attacks on civilian targets in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv by 
                                                                                                                 
raising money “under the cloak of a humanitarian or charitable exercise,” and through the 
legislation resolved to “severely restrict[] the ability of terrorist organizations to raise much 
needed funds for their terrorist acts within the United States.”). For a discussion of the 
history of the passage of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, see Chesney, supra note 13, at 12–18. 
 87.  Norman Abrams, The Material Support Terrorism Offenses: Perspectives Derived 
from the (Early) Model Penal Code, 1 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 5, 7 (2005). 
 88.  Exec. Order No. 12,947, 3 C.F.R. 319 (1995). For a detailed discussion of the 
history of IEEPA and its use in times of national emergency, as well as the consequences of 
being designated, see Nina J. Crimm, High Alert: The Government’s War on the Financing 
of Terrorism and Its Implications for Donors, Domestic Charitable Organizations, and 
Global Philanthropy, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1341, 1354–74 (2004). 
 89.  Exec. Order No. 12,947, 3 C.F.R. 319 (1995). The executive order was issued in the 
direct aftermath of a suicide bombing attack in Beit Lid, Israel by a group opposed to the 
United States-sponsored Middle East peace process of that time. The White House, Office of 
the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Executive Order on Transactions with Terrorists Who 
Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process (Jan. 24, 1995), available at 
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1995/html/Dispatchv6no05.html. The executive 
order was of questionable efficacy, in that it had the effect of designating as SDTs groups and 
individuals who in some cases were incapacitated and in others had no assets to speak of in the 
United States, and therefore posed little or no ostensible threat to the peace process. For example, 
Abbud Al-Zumar, a leader of the Egyptian Jihad group, was listed, as was Shaykh Ahmad Yasin, 
the founder and ideological leader of Hamas. In January 1995, Al-Zumar had been in prison in 
Egypt since 1981 for his role in the Jihad’s assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, while 
Yasin was in an Israeli prison serving a lengthy sentence. Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, listed as 
Shaykh Umar Abd Al-Rahman, was detained and had just begun his nine-month criminal trial in 
federal court earlier in January 1995. See United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 111 (2d Cir. 
1999); 60 Fed. Reg. 5084-01 (Jan. 25, 1995); BENNY MORRIS, RIGHTEOUS VICTIMS: A HISTORY OF 
THE ZIONIST-ARAB CONFLICT, 1881–1999, at 626, 645 (2001); MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, 
Egyptian Islamic Jihad, available at http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=3611. 
 90.  See Chesney, supra note 13, at 15–17. 
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the Palestinian groups Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), 
respectively.91 So, while the timing may have been coincidental,92 in practice, the 
passage of the material support ban occurred when the problem of international 
terrorism, in the eyes of the United States government, significantly concerned 
violence committed by subnational groups opposed to the Middle East peace 
process.93  
B. The Designation Process and the Ensuing Legal Debate 
1. Designation Process 
A defendant in a § 2339B prosecution may not defend himself against charges 
of supporting an FTO by arguing that the organization he allegedly supported was 
improperly designated an FTO.94 For this reason, a discussion of the FTO-
designation process is in order. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1189, the Secretary of State, in 
consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury, may 
designate a group as an FTO on the basis of an administrative record she compiles, 
a record which, of necessity, contains classified information.95 The actual 
designation is made public in the Federal Register a mere seven days after the 
Secretary of State informs specified members of Congress of the decision to 
designate and gives them the information on which her decision is based.96 She 
                                                                                                                 
 
 91.  See Serge Schmemann, Arafat Men Seize 3 in Hamas; Not Enough, Peres Says, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1996, at A6. As a result of the bombings, the United States convened a 
summit on terrorism in the Middle East, which was held in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt in 
March 1996. See Steven Erlanger, Summit in Egypt: The Symbolism; the Meeting’s Message: 
Put Terrorists on Notice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1996, at A10. When the first list of FTOs was 
issued by the Secretary of State in accordance with AEDPA in 1997, it contained a large 
number of groups active in the Arab-Israeli conflict. See, e.g., Designation of Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations, 62 Fed. Reg. 52650-01 (Oct. 8, 1997). 
 92.  For an argument that the passage of the law was not coincidental, see Michael E. 
Deutsch & Erica Thompson, Secrets and Lies: The Persecution of Muhammad Salah (Part 
I), 37 J. PALESTINE STUD. 38, 40 (2008). 
 93.  Indeed, Al-Qaeda was not present on the first list of FTOs and was only designated 
as such in October 1999. See Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 64 Fed. Reg. 
55112-01 (Oct. 8, 1999). Despite the seeming urgency of the need to stop foreign groups 
from raising money for terrorist activities under the guise of charity, there were only three 
pre-9/11 prosecutions under the statute, two of which dealt with materially supporting 
Hizballah. See United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (material 
support to Hizballah), rev’d on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1097, reinstated in part, 405 F.3d 
1034 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. 
Assi, 414 F. Supp. 2d 707 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (material support to Hizballah).  
 94.  8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(8) (2006) (“If a designation under this subsection has become 
effective under paragraph (2)(B) a defendant in a criminal action or an alien in a removal 
proceeding shall not be permitted to raise any question concerning the validity of the 
issuance of such designation as a defense or an objection at any trial or hearing.”).  
 95.  Id. § 1189(a), (d). 
 96.  Id. § 1189(a)(2)(A).  
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does not provide prior notice to the foreign organization that is being designated. 
To make such a designation, the Secretary of State must determine that: 
(A) the organization is a foreign organization; 
(B) the organization engages in terrorist activity (as defined in section 
1182(a)(3)(B) of this title) or terrorism (as defined in section 
2656f(d)(2) of Title 22), or retains the capability and intent to engage in 
terrorist activity or terrorism; and 
(C) the terrorist activity or terrorism of the organization threatens the 
security of United States nationals or the national security of the United 
States.97 
Designations last until the Secretary of State or Congress decides to revoke them, 
or until they are judicially overturned.98 
According to the language of the statute, designated groups may choose to 
challenge their designations by seeking judicial review, but all such challenges 
must be made in the D.C. Circuit within thirty days of the designation being 
published in the Federal Register.99 During the review process, the court may rely 
only on the administrative record generated by the Secretary of State, and, on an ex 
parte and in camera basis, the Secretary of State may supplement this record with 
                                                                                                                 
 
 97.  Id. § 1189(a)(1)(A)–(C). “Terrorist activity” is defined as follows: 
[T]he term “terrorist activity” means any activity which is unlawful under the 
laws of the place where it is committed (or which, if it had been committed in 
the United States, would be unlawful under the laws of the United States or any 
State) and which involves any of the following: 
 (I) The highjacking or sabotage of any conveyance (including an aircraft, 
vessel, or vehicle). 
 (II) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to 
detain, another individual in order to compel a third person (including a 
governmental organization) to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or 
implicit condition for the release of the individual seized or detained. 
 (III) A violent attack upon an internationally protected person (as defined in 
section 1116(b)(4) of title 18) or upon the liberty of such a person. 
 (IV) An assassination. 
 (V) The use of any— 
  (a) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or device, 
or 
  (b) explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous device (other 
than for mere personal monetary gain), 
with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more 
individuals or to cause substantial damage to property. 
 (VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing. 
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii). 
 98.  8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(4)–(6).  
 99.  Id. § 1189(c). For a criticism of this provision, see Randolph N. Jonakait, A Double 
Due Process Denial: The Crime of Providing Material Support or Resources to Designated 
Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 125 (2003) (recommending the use 
of notice and a hearing before an organization is designated an FTO). 
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classified information used in making the designation.100 A decision to designate 
can be set aside by the court of review only if it is  
(a) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law; (b) contrary to constitutional right, power, 
privilege, or immunity; (c) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, 
or limitation, or short of statutory right; (d) lacking substantial support 
in the administrative record taken as a whole or in classified 
information submitted to the court; or (e) not in accord with the 
procedures required by law.101  
During the pendency of a challenge to a designation, the designation remains in 
force.102 A group may also petition to have its designation revoked administratively 
by the Secretary of State.103 Overall, however, by keeping designations valid 
indefinitely and placing the burden on an FTO to challenge its designation, the 
statutory scheme minimizes the potential of an organization to overturn its 
designation, all the while consolidating power in the executive branch at the 
expense of the judiciary.104 Critically, when a designation is used as the basis for a 
criminal prosecution, “a defendant in a criminal action . . . shall not be permitted to 
raise any question concerning the validity of the issuance of such designation as a 
defense or an objection at any trial or hearing.”105 
2. Legal Challenges 
Only a few groups have attempted to challenge their designations as FTOs in the 
D.C. Circuit, and those challenges have been almost uniformly unsuccessful. In 
1999, in the first challenge of its kind, the court upheld the FTO designations of the 
People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) and the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE), ruling that “a foreign entity without property or presence in 
this country has no constitutional rights, under the Due Process Clause or 
otherwise.”106 Two years later, when the National Council of Resistance of Iran 
                                                                                                                 
 
 100.  Id. § (a)(7). The D.C. Circuit recently remarked that it has yet to decide whether a 
designation that was based in large part on classified information would comport with due 
process. See People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 613 F.3d 220, 231 (D.C. Cir. 
2010) (“[N]one of [the D.C. Circuit’s] cases decides whether an administrative decision 
relying critically on undisclosed classified material would comport with due process because 
in none was the classified record essential to uphold an FTO designation.”). 
 101.  8 U.S.C. § 1189(c)(3). 
 102.  Id. § 1189(c)(4). 
 103.  Id. § 1189(a)(4)(B); see also Julie B. Shapiro, The Politicization of the Designation 
of Foreign Terrorist Organizations: The Effects on the Separation of Powers, 6 CARDOZO 
PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 547, 573–75 (2008). 
 104.  See Shapiro, supra note 103. Additionally, Congress may stop or revoke a 
designation via an act of Congress, although the statute is silent on what might bring about 
such a result. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(5). 
 105.  8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(8); see, e.g., United States v. Chandia, 514 F.3d 365, 371 (4th 
Cir. 2008); United States v. Afshari, 426 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 106.  People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 20 n.3, 22 (D.C. 
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(NCRI) was designated an FTO on the basis of its being an alter ego of the PMOI, 
it also challenged its status.107 The D.C. Circuit ruled that because the NCRI held 
an interest in a bank account in the United States, it had a presence in the United 
States, so its designation by the Secretary of State violated due process in that it 
received no prior notice of its designation and no opportunity to be heard.108 Due 
process required that the NCRI receive notice, before the designations were 
finalized, of the unclassified items in the administrative record upon which the 
Secretary was relying, as well as an opportunity to present evidence to rebut that 
record, at the least in the form of a written submission.109 Even though the court 
found due process to have been violated, it refused to set aside the designation of 
the NCRI and instead remanded the matter to the Secretary to provide adequate 
notice, allow for a response to the administrative record, and permit the NCRI to 
present evidence in defense of its contention that it was not a terrorist group.110 
After providing the NCRI with proper notice and an opportunity to be heard, 
subject to the limitations imposed by statute, the Secretary designated the group as 
an FTO once again, and the D.C. Circuit subsequently upheld the designation.111  
The PMOI challenged its designation yet again in 2008, citing a change in 
circumstances.112 Although the group had received notice of the Secretary of 
State’s intention to renew the designation, the D.C. Circuit ruled that due process 
was violated when the Secretary did not provide the PMOI an opportunity to rebut 
the allegations in the unclassified section of the administrative record.113 Without 
                                                                                                                 
Cir. 1999) (The group is also known as Mujahedin-e-Khalq or MEK.); see also 32 Cnty. 
Sovereignty Comm. v. Dep’t of State, 292 F.3d 797 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (upholding the 
designation of an alter ego of the Real IRA, a banned FTO, on the same basis). 
 107.  Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001). 
 108.  See id. at 196, 200–01, 204. The court did not rule out post-designation notice 
where prior notice would impinge on the national security of the United States or other 
foreign policy goals. Id. at 208. 
 109.  Id. at 209. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 373 F.3d 152, 159–60 (D.C. 
Cir. 2004); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1245 (D.C. 
Cir. 2003).  
 112.  People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 613 F.3d 220, 225 (D.C. Cir. 
2010) (“[S]ince its initial FTO designation in 1997, it had: ceased its military campaign 
against the Iranian regime and renounced violence in 2001; voluntarily handed over its arms 
to U.S. forces in Iraq and cooperated with U.S. officials at Camp Ashraf (where all of its 
members operating in Iraq are consolidated) in 2003; shared intelligence with the U.S. 
government regarding Iran’s nuclear program; in 2004 obtained ‘protected person’ status 
under the Fourth Geneva Convention for all PMOI members at Camp Ashraf based on the 
U.S. investigators’ conclusions that none was a combatant or had committed a crime under 
any U.S. laws; disbanded its military units and disarmed the PMOI members at Ashraf, all of 
whom signed a document rejecting violence and terror; and obtained delisting as a terrorist 
organization from the United Kingdom (the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission 
and the Court of Appeal) in 2008 and from the European Union (the European Court of First 
Instance) in 2009. The PMOI also thrice supplemented its petition with additional 
information and letters in support from members of the U.S. Congress, members of the UK 
and European parliaments and retired members of the U.S. military, among others.”). 
 113.  Id. at 227–28. It appears that the State Department takes seriously its responsibility 
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overturning the designation, the D.C. Circuit remanded the matter to the Secretary, 
ordering her to allow the PMOI to prepare a rebuttal to the unclassified information 
in the administrative record.114 In total, therefore, the D.C. Circuit’s opinions in 
designation cases demonstrate a strict unwillingness to consider the foreign policies 
behind any particular group’s designation, and are focused instead on whether the 
statute has been properly applied. In so doing, the opinions offer no guidance on 
what factors might allow a group to overcome its designation. 
3. The Rahmani/Afshari Litigation 
United States v. Rahmani, a criminal prosecution from the Central District of 
California, generated significant jurisprudence on the designation process in a case 
involving constitutional challenges to the indictment of various individuals of 
Iranian origin for raising funds in the United States on behalf of the PMOI.115 The 
district court rejected the contention that the D.C. Circuit was the sole arbiter of an 
FTO’s designation, basing its reasoning on the fact the statutory language did not 
provide clear and compelling evidence of Congress’s intent to divest courts in other 
circuits of judicial review over the process.116 It held that it could no more be 
stripped of the power to review the underlying designation than it could the power 
to examine the sufficiency of an indictment.117 The court then held § 1189 
unconstitutional on its face because the statute denied a designated FTO proper 
notice, access to the evidence against it, and a meaningful opportunity to present its 
own evidence against an attempt to designate.118 With respect to the first PMOI 
opinion, the Rahmani court essentially found that there could be no finding of 
constitutionality when a statute was applied to an entity that enjoyed no 
constitutional rights due to its lack of presence in the United States.119 As to the 
second PMOI ruling, it held that it had not addressed the facial constitutionality of 
the statutory scheme, but only the as-applied challenge based on the NCRI’s lack of 
notice and hearing.120 Finally, the court addressed the government’s point that 
invalidating § 1189 would damage United States national security by hampering 
counterterrorism efforts: 
                                                                                                                 
to provide notice to groups with a presence in the United States. In at least one case, the 
State Department invited individuals it believed represented Kahane Chai (Kach), a 
designated FTO, to bring forth a challenge to its designation, which the D.C. Circuit upheld 
after the government turned over the nonclassified portion of the administrative record. See 
Chai v. Dep’t of State, 466 F.3d 125, 134 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 114.  People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran, 613 F.3d at 229. 
 115.  209 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (C.D. Cal. 2002), rev’d sub nom. United States v. Afshari, 
392 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2004), reh’g, 426 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2005).  
 116.  See id. at 1053, 1053 n.10 (citing fundamental fairness concerns, and pointing out 
that the first D.C. Circuit ruling in the PMOI saga remarked on its “inability to conduct an 
effective judicial review of the designation”). 
 117.  Id. at 1054–55. 
 118.  Id. at 1055–59 (rejecting the government’s argument that the first two rulings from 
the D.C. Circuit in the PMOI saga upheld the constitutionality of the designation process). 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. at 1056–57 (“[T]his is no longer judicial construction; it is impermissible 
judicial legislation.” (citations omitted)). 
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National security is certainly a matter of grave concern and 
responsibility. When weighed against a fundamental constitutional right 
which defines our very existence, the argument for national security 
should not serve as an excuse for obliterating the Constitution. Every 
effort should be made to weigh the circumstances where national 
security concerns can rationally coexist within a constitutional 
atmosphere. No such attempts were made by the Secretary.  
 The moral strength, vitality and commitment proudly enunciated in 
the Constitution is best tested at a time when forceful, emotionally 
moving arguments to ignore or trivialize its provisions seek a 
subordination of time honored constitutional protections. Such 
protections should not be dispensed with where the Secretary has not 
shown how the [PMOI] is a national security threat.121 
The ruling in Rahmani holding § 1189 unconstitutional and thus dismissing the 
indictment against the defendants was directly overturned by the Ninth Circuit 
under the name of United States v. Afshari.122 In spite of the statutory language in 
§ 1189 that prescribes setting aside the designation if it violates one of the 
explicitly stated grounds, the Ninth Circuit refused to second-guess either the 
decision of the Secretary of State to designate the PMOI or the D.C. Circuit’s 
decision not to overturn the designation in the NCRI case, finding that it lacked the 
authority to do so.123 The court then rejected the defendants’ further due process 
challenge arising out of the unconstitutional designation of the PMOI, on the basis 
of the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in the NCRI case. First, it cited to Supreme Court 
precedent that allowed for prosecution on felon-in-possession charges even when 
the underlying felony charges had been subsequently reversed on appeal.124 It noted 
that the NCRI decision did not actually result in the PMOI’s designation being set 
aside, and that where there was no question as to the validity of the designation, the 
elements of § 2339B required only knowledge that a group was designated.125 
Further, it held that where the PMOI had admitted to numerous terrorist acts, any 
constitutional deprivation was harmless.126 This was despite the PMOI’s assertion 
of a “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” theory to oppose its FTO designation 
(based on its opposition to the Iranian government, a designated state sponsor of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 121.  Id. at 1057–58 (footnote omitted). 
 122.  426 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2005). As an initial matter, the court found that restricting 
judicial review of the designation process to the D.C. Circuit was not unconstitutional, and 
cited several other statutes that provided for judicial review in a specified circuit. Id. at 
1154–55. Prior to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Afshari, courts in other districts had 
disagreed with the ruling in Rahmani. See, e.g., United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348, 
363–64 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding the Rahmani opinion “unpersuasive”). 
 123.  Afshari, 426 F.3d at 1156. 
 124.  Id. at 1157 (citing Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 62, 64 (1980)). 
 125.  Id. at 1157–58 (citing United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 331 (4th Cir. 
2004) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005), reinstated in part, 405 F.3d 
1034 (4th Cir.) (“[Congress has provided that] the fact of an organization’s designation as an 
[FTO] is an element of § 2339B, but the validity . . . is not.” (emphasis in original)). 
 126.  Id. at 1158. 
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terrorism).127 To cement its holding on this point, the court likened the case before 
it to previous decisions involving violations of the Export Administration Act, 
where the convictions of individuals charged with exporting restricted goods 
without the proper license were upheld—the issue there was not whether the 
restriction on the good was valid, but rather whether the defendant knew of the 
existence of the restriction.128 
Even though the district court had not ruled on the First Amendment claims 
presented by the defendants, since it ceased its analysis once it held the designation 
process unconstitutional, the Ninth Circuit directly addressed those claims.129 In 
response to the defendants’ arguments that their First Amendment rights to free 
speech were being suppressed by the ban on funding FTOs, the court emphatically 
ruled that providing money to an FTO could not be construed as speech, and 
therefore the ban on material support need not be subject to strict scrutiny.130 It 
remarked that “[g]uns and bombs are not speech,” and that “[t]here is no First 
Amendment right ‘to facilitate terrorism by giving terrorists the weapons and 
explosives with which to carry out their grisly missions.’”131 The court concluded 
with the following paragraph explaining its view that courts and juries could not 
appropriately consider defenses to § 2339B prosecutions rooted in politics: 
Conceivably the [PMOI] developed its practices at a time when the 
United States supported the previous regime in Iran, and maintained its 
position while harbored by the Saddam Hussein Ba’ath regime in Iraq. 
Maybe the [PMOI’s] position will change, or has changed, so that its 
interest in overturning the current regime in Iran coincides with the 
interests of the United States. Defendants could be right about the 
[PMOI]. But that is not for us, or for a jury in defendants’ case, to say. 
The sometimes subtle analysis of a foreign organization’s political 
program to determine whether it is indeed a terrorist threat to the 
United States is particularly within the expertise of the State 
Department and the Executive Branch. Juries could not make reliable 
determinations without extensive foreign policy education and the 
disclosure of classified materials. Nor is it appropriate for a jury in a 
criminal case to make foreign policy decisions for the United States. 
Leaving the determination of whether a group is a “foreign terrorist 
organization” to the Executive Branch, coupled with the procedural 
protections and judicial review afforded by the statute, is both a 
reasonable and a constitutional way to make such determinations. The 
Constitution does not forbid Congress from requiring individuals, 
whether they agree with the Executive Branch determination or not, to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 127.  Id.  
 128.  Id. at 1158–59 (citing United States v. Bozarov, 974 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir.1992); 
United States v. Mandel, 914 F.2d 1221 n.11 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
 129.  Id. at 1159–61. 
 130.  Id.; see also Hammoud, 381 F.3d at 328–29 (employing similar reasoning). 
 131.  Afshari, 426 F.3d at 1161 (quoting Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 
1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
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refrain from furnishing material assistance to designated terrorist 
organizations during the period of designation.132 
Judge Kozinski, joined by four other judges, dissented from the refusal of the 
Ninth Circuit to rehear the Afshari/Rahmani case en banc.133 He argued that while 
providing money to a designated FTO was not protected speech, the issue in this 
case was whether the designation process was constitutional, since, if the 
designation of the PMOI were held unconstitutional, providing money to it would 
amount to a form of protected speech.134 In his view, since the ban on material 
support was a type of prior restraint of speech, in order for the designation process 
to be found constitutional, it had to comply with the standards laid out by the 
Supreme Court in Freedman v. Maryland135 and McKinney v. Alabama,136 a 
position explicitly rejected by the panel in its opinion.137 Under Freedman, “only a 
judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity 
to freedom of expression, [thus] only a procedure requiring a judicial determination 
suffices to impose a valid final restraint.”138 Judge Kozinski argued that none of 
these factors were present, given that the process puts the burden of challenging a 
designation on the organization, that the ban on support remains in force during the 
pendency of any proceedings, that the statute does not ensure a prompt judicial 
determination (especially where a foreign organization is adjudged to have no 
constitutional rights), and that, thus, there is no opportunity for meaningful 
review.139 Even though the D.C. Circuit refused to set aside the designation of the 
PMOI, it did hold the designation to have been unconstitutional in the years 1997–
2001, precisely the time frame that the defendants were charged with providing 
material support, a result that Judge Kozinski found to be a “uniquely 
unconstitutional (and oxymoronic) practice: an ex post facto prior restraint.”140 
In discussing McKinney’s applicability to the instant case, Judge Kozinski noted 
initially that “[i]t is not at all clear to me that a constitutional challenge that can 
                                                                                                                 
 
 132.  Id. at 1162 (footnote omitted). 
 133.  United States v. Afshari, 446 F.3d 915, 915–22 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting). 
 134.  Id. at 917–18. 
 135.  380 U.S. 51, 59–60 (1965) (holding unconstitutional a Maryland statutory scheme 
banning the showing of obscene films on threat of criminal prosecution since (a) the burden 
of initiating judicial review was on the exhibitor of the film; (b) the film would remain 
banned pending judicial review; and (c) there was no prompt assurance of judicial review). 
 136.  424 U.S. 669, 676–77 (1976) (holding that in a prosecution for selling an obscene 
magazine in violation of the law, the defendant had a right to challenge the underlying 
designation as such in his own criminal trial). 
 137.  Afshari, 446 F.3d at 918. 
 138.  Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (quoting Freedman, 380 U.S. at 
58). 
 139.  Id. at 919. 
 140.  Id. at 919–21 (emphasis in original) (“The simple fact is that Rahmani is being 
prosecuted—and will surely be sent to prison for up to 10 years—for giving money to an 
organization that no one other than some obscure mandarin in the bowels of the State 
Department had determined to be a terrorist organization. The panel has simply overruled 
Freedman—without so much as mentioning it.”). 
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(maybe) be raised only by a third party in a separate proceeding can ever be an 
adequate substitute for the procedures specified in McKinney.”141 However, even 
accepting the panel’s reasoning that the PMOI designation was subject to judicial 
review, he remarked that during the time period at issue, the designation was held 
to be improper by the D.C. Circuit. He explained that this holding effectively stated 
that any money sent to the PMOI should be considered donations to a legitimate 
political organization that are deserving of the heightened protection afforded 
political speech.142 Likewise, the government’s attempt to frame the issue as one of 
national security in which the judiciary must defer to the executive must fail, since, 
Kozinski reasoned, there was no issue of national security once the designation was 
found to be improper.143 
While Kozinski pointed out his belief that the designation process should be 
held unconstitutional, he opined that the panel could have dismissed the action 
without interfering with the decision of the D.C. Circuit regarding the designation 
of the PMOI.144 He reasoned that the panel could have simply ruled that an 
unconstitutional designation like that at the heart of the NCRI case could not serve 
as the basis for a criminal prosecution, and left the subsequent PMOI designation 
intact, with all the attendant consequences.145 Such a result would not have 
interfered with another circuit court’s decision on the issue of the designation of the 
PMOI.146 Judge Kozinski then concluded with the following observation:  
I can understand the panel’s reticence to interfere with matters of 
national security, but the entire purpose of the terrorist designation 
process is to determine whether an organization poses a threat to 
national security. Under the Constitution, the State Department does 
not have carte blanche to label any organization it chooses a foreign 
terrorist organization and make a criminal out of anyone who donates 
money to it. Far too much political activity could be suppressed under 
such a regime.147 
4. The Debate over the Definition of a Terrorist Group 
A review of the cases involving challenges to an FTO designation demonstrates 
the difficulties of engaging in a debate over what groups or actors, if any, are 
entitled to commit violence in the service of a political cause. That the three circuit 
courts that have examined the designation process have all found it to be 
constitutional reveals the reluctance of appointed federal judges to become 
involved in what is reasonably perceived to be a foreign policy question rightly 
committed to the political branches. The legal challenges themselves highlight the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 141.  Id. at 920–21 (emphasis in original). 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. at 922 (“What possible relevance could national security have once the terrorist 
designation was declared unconstitutional?”). 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
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difficulty of applying a definition of terrorism to all nonstate actors148 active around 
the world in political violence. While producing a universally accepted definition 
of terrorism in international law has proved elusive, and may even be impossible, 
the area of greatest consensus appears to be a definition that prohibits violent 
attacks on civilians with the intent to intimidate or coerce a sovereign 
government.149 A glance at the relevant definitions of terrorism in domestic law 
confirms American acceptance of this general principle.150 
Based on the above definition, none of the groups on the FTO list can complain 
that they are unfairly listed. Since all of the groups can be tied to acts of political 
violence that harmed civilians at some point in their respective histories, 
characterizing them as “terrorist” is both unsurprising and uncontroversial. Even 
leaving aside the perhaps unfair focus on nonstate actors as terrorists, the definition 
of the term in U.S. law, in accordance with international law, is relatively clear that 
groups engaging in violent activity in pursuit of political goals run the risk of being 
declared terrorist organizations.151 Of course, not all groups that engage in 
terrorism under the relevant statutes will be so designated.152 So, while the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 148.  In analyzing terrorism prosecutions in federal court, this article is bound by the 
relevant definitions in United States law, as discussed. Outside the scope of the laws 
referenced infra, when this article refers to “terrorism” in general, it does not incorporate the 
category of state terrorism, but rather focuses solely on violence against civilians by nonstate 
actors. See Neuman, supra note 44, at 288–89 (adopting this approach). 
 149.  See, e.g., Karima Bennoune, Terror/Torture, 26 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 19–27 
(2008) (noting that an internationally agreed-upon definition exists, and that the current 
debate centers on the exceptions to that definition); George P. Fletcher, The Indefinable 
Concept of Terrorism, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 894, 911 (2006) (“A concept like terrorism that 
lies at the centre of our political life may not lend itself to the discipline of legal thinking. It 
is probably like the notions of ‘democracy’ or ‘constitutionalism’ or ‘rule of law’—too 
important to be settled once and for all in a legislative definition.”); Michael P. Scharf, 
Defining Terrorism as the Peacetime Equivalent of War Crimes: Problems and Prospect, 36 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 359, 360–63 (2004); Young, supra note 44, at 42. 
 150.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(A)–(C) (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) (2006) (defining 
“international terrorism” as “violent acts or acts dangerous to human life” occurring abroad 
that are intended “(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy 
of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by 
mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping”); see also 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2006) 
(“[T]he term ‘terrorism’ means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated 
against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.”). 
 151.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (defining “international terrorism” as “violent acts or acts 
dangerous to human life,” which seek “(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to 
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the 
conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping”). 
 152.  A relatively high-profile example is that of the Cambodian Freedom Fighters 
(CFF), which carried out an attack on the Cambodian government in 2000 in which several 
people were killed, at a time when Cambodia was not at war with the United States. The 
attack was planned by the CFF’s leadership in the United States, which openly raised funds 
for the group’s violent activities. See Joshua Kurlantzick, The Strip Mall Revolutionaries, 
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 21, 2004, at 50. The incident eventually led to the CFF’s leader 
being convicted on charges of conspiracy to commit murder abroad and violations of the 
Neutrality Act, although the CFF has not been designated as an FTO, therefore ensuring no 
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definition of terrorism underpinning the designation process is universal in its 
nature, just because a group could be listed does not mean that it will be. For a 
terrorist group to be banned, it has to threaten the security of U.S. nationals or 
American “national security,”153 which is defined as “the national defense, foreign 
relations, or economic interests of the United States.”154 
Essentially, the list of FTOs contains two types of groups: (1) those that 
genuinely threaten the national security of the United States in a direct way, such as 
by targeting its nationals and government; and (2) those that challenge the more 
opaque foreign relations or economic interests of the United States. While courts 
have determined that the extent of a group’s threat to American national security 
will not be subjected to scrutiny after the fact,155 banning groups that fall into the 
latter category raises certain questions about the designation process and the 
purposes it serves.156 As scholars have noted, echoing Judge Kozinski’s point in 
dissent in Afshari, the amount of judicial deference given to a finding by the 
executive that a group harms national security to the extent that it should be listed 
as an FTO, renders such a decision essentially unreviewable.157 At the most basic 
level, this position makes sense, even if the outcome results in a concentration of 
power in the executive; judges are not in a position, politically or informationally, 
to render decisions on whether a group’s activities actually harm U.S. national 
security in its expansive definition. However, despite a group’s inability to 
ascertain, by litigation or otherwise, what national security reasons cause it to be 
                                                                                                                 
criminal exposure results from materially supporting its activities that cannot be explicitly 
linked to violence. See Man Guilty of Cambodia Coup Plot, BBC NEWS (Apr. 17, 2008), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7351778.stm. While the CFF, along with several 
other organizations, including the Irish Republican Army, was previously listed as a 
“terrorist group” by the State Department, it was then classified as a “group of concern,” and 
it now appears that the most recent incarnations of the State Department’s terrorism report 
have eliminated this category, concentrating instead on FTOs exclusively. Compare OFFICE 
OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON 
TERRORISM 2009 ch. 6 (2010) [hereinafter STATE DEPARTMENT TERRORISM REPORT 2009] 
(only listing FTOs), with OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEP’T 
OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2005, at 234–35 (2006) (listing the CFF as a 
“group of concern”), and OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEP’T 
OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 2003, at 142–43 (2004) (listing the CFF as a 
“terrorist organization”). 
 153.  8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(c). 
 154.  Id. § 1189(d)(2). 
 155.  See People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 23 (D.C. Cir. 
1999) (“[I]t is beyond the judicial function for a court to review foreign policy decisions of 
the Executive Branch. These are political judgments, ‘decisions of a kind for which the 
Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and have long been held to belong 
in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.’” (quoting 
Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948))); see also 
Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1366, 1374–75 
(2009). 
 156.  Most of the groups on the FTO list tend to be marginal in terms of membership, the 
level of popular support they enjoy among their purported constituents, and their willingness 
to participate in legitimate civilian governments. The two exceptions to this general rule are 
the Lebanese group Hizballah and the Palestinian group Hamas.  
 157.  See, e.g., COLE & LOBEL, supra note 11, at 54. 
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designated an FTO, the designation process sends a few clear messages regarding 
the United States’ position on violence in the service of political goals. 
First, a review of the handful of designation challenges suggests that the 
organizations involved were disputing, at least initially, not the fact that they 
engaged in violence in service of their respective causes, but rather the finding that 
they threatened, even indirectly, the United States.158 In other words, if the real 
enemy is Islamic fundamentalism, why should the United States list as terrorists a 
group composed of Iranian exiles fighting the Islamic government in Tehran, a 
Tamil movement fighting the Sri Lankan government, a dissident Irish republican 
group, or an anti-Arab Israeli group? These groups are all either peripheral 
themselves or engaged in struggles that do not impinge on major U.S. foreign 
policy interests. The groups admit that they are guilty of engaging in terrorism as 
defined by domestic law, but that the government should simply not bother to ban 
them because they do not constitute a nuisance to the United States.159 
Additionally, the LTTE attempted, without success, to argue that it could not be 
designated an FTO according to the operative statute, since it was not an 
organization, but rather a foreign government.160 The above arguments failed to 
persuade courts to reverse the designation. 
Second, and on a somewhat related note, arguments that a designated group has 
interests similar to those of the United States, on the “an enemy of my enemy is my 
friend” theory, will also fail. The PMOI-affiliated defendants in the 
Rahmani/Afshari litigation attempted this line of argument and failed to convince 
the Ninth Circuit to overturn a designation.161 This occurred despite the support of 
numerous members of Congress for overturning the ban on the PMOI, the existence 
of a cooperation agreement between the group and the U.S. military in Iraq (where 
the group maintains a military camp), and a common enemy (the government of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran).162 The government has continued to prosecute PMOI-
affiliated officials; in one recent case, the official in question was a resident in the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 158.  See supra Part II.B.2. It was only after its main military base in Iraq came under the 
control of the U.S. military that the PMOI claimed that it had renounced violence. See supra 
note 112 and accompanying text. 
 159.  See, e.g., Chai v. Dep’t of State, 466 F.3d 125, 129–30 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (discussing 
Kach/Kahane Chai’s links to terrorist activity); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of 
State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (detailing a list of violent attacks the PMOI 
admits to having committed against targets of the Iranian government). 
 160.  People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran, 182 F.3d at 24 (noting that because the 
government has failed to recognized the LTTE as a foreign government, the court cannot 
judicially make such a finding). The LTTE stands for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, 
and are more commonly known as the Tamil Tigers. 
 161.  See United States v. Afshari, 426 F.3d 1150, 1157–58 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 162.  United States v. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1051 (C.D. Cal. 2002), rev’d sub 
nom. United States v. Afshari, 392 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2004), reh’g granted, 426 F.3d 1150 
(9th Cir. 2005); Shapiro, supra note 103, at 579–83 (arguing that the PMOI’s designation as 
an FTO stems in great part from the American government’s desire to appease Iran in the 
context of the two nations’ otherwise extremely tense bilateral relationship); Sam Dagher, 
Iranian Resistance Group Criticizes Iraq’s Efforts to Expel It, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2008, at 
A11 (explaining that the PMOI has “enjoyed the protection of the American military since 
2003”). 
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Iraqi camp where all the residents had been cleared by the U.S. military of any 
violations of American law.163 Whatever the compatibility of the PMOI’s agenda 
with United States national security interests, it would seem that convergence with 
American foreign policy goals does not suffice to bar a group from inclusion on the 
FTO list where the group has committed violence considered illegal by U.S. law.  
5. Further Implications 
What the legal challenges to the designation process have revealed is that any 
political violence carried out by a nonstate actor, whether or not linked to the 
United States, is sufficient to render the nonstate actor an FTO. When taken out of 
the narrow confines of the designation debate, this ostensible ban on nonstate 
political violence in all contexts reveals itself to be potentially limitless. Consider 
the immigration context, where providing material support to a group engaged in 
“terrorist activity,” that is, violence in support of political goals—regardless of 
whether the group committing it has been listed or designated by any government 
agency—triggers a statutory prohibition on political asylum in and withholding of 
removal from the United States.164 Professor Gerald Neuman provides the 
following analysis of this aspect of U.S. immigration law: 
 Read literally, “terrorist activity” would include the unlawful shooting 
of an abusive husband by a battered spouse, and perhaps more 
importantly, would include any locally unlawful use of a firearm for 
political purposes, including self-defense or use in insurgency 
consistent with the laws of war. Even if such actions do not constitute 
“terrorism” within any other legally operative definition, they may 
constitute “terrorist activity” rendering an alien inadmissible or 
deportable under the [Immigration and Nationalization Act].165 
The definition of “terrorist activity” in the immigration context is the same as 
that used to support a designation under 8 U.S.C. § 1189; so while the two statutory 
schemes serve different legislative purposes, the position on what constitutes 
terrorism is basically identical.166 The two contexts are further intertwined when 
one considers that the term “material support” in the context of terrorism first 
                                                                                                                 
 
 163.  United States v. Taleb-Jedi, 566 F. Supp. 2d 157, 185 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (upholding 
prosecution of a PMOI official formerly resident at group’s Iraq camp upon return to the 
United States); Douglas Jehl, People’s Mujahedeen: U.S. Sees No Basis to Prosecute Iranian 
Opposition “Terror” Group Being Held in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2004, at A8 (noting 
that while the State Department did not consider the “determination of the status of [the 
PMOI] in Iraq” as having any bearing on “its status as a terrorist organization,” American 
officials “did not expect any of [the camp’s residents] to be charged in American courts”). 
 164.  See S-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 936, 937–38 (BIA 2006) (citing relevant legislative 
provisions). 
 165.  Gerald L. Neuman, Terrorism, Selective Deportation and the First Amendment 
After Reno v. AADC, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 313, 327 (2000). 
 166.  Id. (noting that the definition of “terrorist activity” in the immigration context “also 
governs the process, created in 1996, for the designation of ‘foreign terrorist 
organizations’”). 
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appeared in congressional debates over what eventually became the Immigration 
Act of 1990.167 
a. Limitless Definitions—Matter of S-K- 
The seemingly limitless nature of what constitutes terrorist activity was given 
expression in the Matter of S-K-, a 2006 decision of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA) on the asylum application of a Burmese national of the Christian 
Chin minority.168 The applicant became acquainted with a member of an 
organization called the Chin National Front (CNF), which is dedicated to the “goal 
of securing freedom for ethnic Chin people” within Burma, and grew sympathetic 
with its cause, eventually donating money and trying to donate other items, such as 
a camera and binoculars.169 When she was warned that the Burmese military had 
been tipped off as to her support of the CNF, she fled to the United States to seek 
political asylum.170 After the immigration judge denied relief, the BIA considered 
the appeal to address the question of “whether the use of justifiable force against an 
illegitimate regime and the right of people to self-determination, which the 
respondent argues is the CNF’s purpose, is a valid purpose, which would not fall 
within the definition of terrorist activity under the [Immigration and 
Nationalization] Act.”171 Because the CNF was found to engage in terrorist activity 
by “us[ing] firearms and/or explosives to engage in combat with the Burmese 
military,” and S-K-’s actions were found to constitute material support of the CNF, 
the BIA denied the application for asylum and withholding of removal.172 
Critically, with respect to the type of struggle the CNF was waging against one of 
the world’s most repressive and ostracized regimes, the BIA noted that “Congress 
intentionally drafted the terrorist bars to relief very broadly, to include even those 
people described as ‘freedom fighters,’ and it did not intend to give us discretion to 
create exceptions for members of organizations to which our Government might be 
sympathetic.”173 
As the concurring opinion of the Vice Chairman pointed out, the upshot of the 
legislative scheme was that “[a]ny group that has used a weapon for any purpose 
other than for personal monetary gain can, under this statute, be labeled a terrorist 
organization.”174 This is true regardless of whether the group in question is allied to 
the United States. For example, at oral argument, the government acknowledged 
that an individual providing material support to the Northern Alliance during the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 167.  Andrew Peterson, Addressing Tomorrow’s Terrorists, 2 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & 
POL’Y 297, 306–26 (2008) (detailing the history of the term and its use in the immigration 
context, where it first appeared). 
 168.  S-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 937. 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Id. at 938. 
 172.  Id. at 941. However, the BIA did grant deferral of removal on Convention Against 
Torture grounds. Id. at 946. 
 173.  Id. at 941. 
 174.  Id. at 948 (Osuna, Acting Vice Chairman, concurring). 
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1990s in its battle with the Taliban would be statutorily barred from asylum based 
on the material support ban.175  
The result in S-K- is the natural outcome of treating all forms of political 
violence by nonstate actors as terrorism. When material support to a group resisting 
one of the world’s most repressive governments is considered support of terrorist 
activity, the very notion of resistance to an oppressive regime, if it functions as the 
official government of a recognized state, becomes suspect by default. There is then 
no method to distinguish a legitimate resistance group from one that is merely 
engaged in illegal violence for illegitimate ends. Thus, although legitimacy stems 
from the people a group purports to represent, as well as international solidarity, an 
organization with a solid popular base or mandate and significant international 
support cannot and will not be able to claim that it is somehow different from a 
more nihilistic or extremist group that operates without such attributes. Put 
differently, a nonstate actor cannot engage in violence against a legitimate 
government without having its supporters run afoul of United States criminal and 
immigration law, no matter how repressive the government’s conduct, and no 
matter if the group restricts its violence to operational military targets.176 
The only way out from under the terrorist stigma is to be declared exempt in 
some form or another. After the BIA’s first decision in S-K-, Congress passed an 
appropriations bill expanding the authority of the Secretary of Homeland Security 
and the Secretary of State to discretionarily grant waivers from the terrorist 
exclusion provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act.177 This congressional 
action coincided with the Secretary of Homeland Security’s decision to grant a 
discretionary waiver to S-K- following the BIA’s remand.178 Additionally, certain 
specifically listed groups, among them the CNF, “shall not be considered to be a 
terrorist organization on the basis of any act or event occurring before the 
[December 26, 2007] date of enactment of this section.”179 Even though the 
government chose to make an exception for the CNF, the second BIA opinion left 
intact the broad definition of terrorist activity articulated in the original opinion.180 
                                                                                                                 
 
 175.  Id. (“This despite the fact that the Northern Alliance was an organization supported 
by the United States in its struggle against a regime that the United States and the vast 
majority of governments around the world viewed as illegitimate.”). 
 176.  This position is in line with the United States’ position rejecting the applicability of 
the First Geneva Protocol’s provisions affording legal combatant status to members of 
national liberation movements. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. However, for an 
argument that armed political groups should have to forswear violence, whether directed at 
civilian or military targets, as a method to attain international legitimacy, see Peter 
Margulies, Laws of Unintended Consequences: Terrorist Financing Restrictions and 
Transitions to Democracy, 20 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 65, 95–96 (2007) (“[V]iolence of any kind 
is a habit. Violence against armed forces shades into violence against civilians, whether 
through collateral damage or through an ongoing disposition to target civilians 
themselves.”). 
 177.  S-K-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 475, 476 (BIA 2008). 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Id. at 476 & n.3 (alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 180.  Id. at 476. 
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b. The Impossibility of Distinguishing Between Groups 
Given this expansive definition of terrorist activity for designation purposes, it is 
not surprising that FTOs cannot avail themselves of arguments rooted in the 
perceived justice of their cause. Consequently, defendants in § 2339B material-
support prosecutions cannot make arguments that sound in the popular legitimacy 
of the group in the area in which it operates. For example, Fawzi Mustafa Assi, a 
naturalized American citizen of Lebanese origin, was charged with providing 
material support to Hizballah, a banned FTO, in the form of night-vision goggles 
and other equipment that could be used for military purposes.181 He attempted to 
argue that, inter alia, under his First Amendment right to free association, his 
support was intended only to assist the group in resisting the Israeli occupation of 
southern Lebanon and could not qualify as material support of terrorism.182 The 
court rejected his First Amendment arguments as far too sweeping to merit 
consideration, in light of the government’s serious concerns with stopping terrorist 
activity in the United States.183  
While Assi’s argument was too broad to be deemed acceptable, S-K- is not the 
only situation in which the definition of terrorism can seem counterintuitive. In 
enacting a kind of blanket ban on political violence by equating it with terrorism, 
curious results can ensue, even long after a designation has been mooted. For 
example, in 2008 it was revealed that former South African president and leader of 
the African National Congress (ANC), Nelson Mandela, was on a United States 
terrorism watch list and, as a result of that status, needed special permission to 
travel to the United States.184 The status of the ANC and Mandela dated from the 
1980s, when the State Department routinely classified the group as a terrorist 
organization.185 To remove him and other ANC members from the watch list 
required legislation by Congress that was speedily passed and signed by President 
George W. Bush.186  
                                                                                                                 
 
 181.  United States v. Assi, 414 F. Supp. 2d 707, 709–11 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Paul Egan, 
Terror Case Plea Dec. 6; Dearborn Man Accused of Providing Support to Hezbollah, 
DETROIT NEWS, Nov. 23, 2007, at B2. 
 182.  Assi, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 711, 715. 
 183.  Id. (“To accept Defendant’s First Amendment challenge under these facts would 
invalidate any attempt to outlaw contributions of military hardware or weaponry to any 
organization, no matter how heinous its actions or abhorrent its mission, so long as the donor 
could identify some political aim he sought to advance through his donation.”). In a similar 
vein, in what was then a joint § 2339B and RICO conspiracy prosecution, defendant 
Muhammad Salah moved that the banned FTO Hamas could not be deemed as a RICO 
enterprise on political question grounds. United States v. Marzook, 426 F. Supp. 2d 820, 824 
(N.D. Ill. 2006). The court found no bar on listing the group as a RICO enterprise and denied 
the motion, explicitly rejecting that Hamas, as a “political force,” could not be deemed a 
“racketeering enterprise.” Id. at 825. 
 184.  Mimi Hall, Mandela Is on U.S. Terrorist Watch List, USA TODAY, May 1, 2008, at 
2A. 
 185.  DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: 
SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY 117 (3d ed. 2006). 
 186.  Mandela Taken Off U.S. Terror List, BBC NEWS (July 1, 2008), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7484517.stm (noting that then-Secretary of State Rice 
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Referring to Nelson Mandela and other ANC members as terrorists may seem 
outrageous to many, given Mandela’s near-saint-like status as a courageous 
freedom fighter who spent twenty-seven years in prison in service of his cause.187 
However, it is legitimate to ponder what distinguishing factors tip the scales in 
favor of embarrassed congressional repudiation of terrorist status in the case of the 
ANC, as opposed to the consistent designation of the PMOI. The ANC, despite its 
having a violent armed wing, engendered massive international support and 
successfully managed to render apartheid South Africa a pariah state before coming 
to power on the heels of the first truly democratic elections in the country’s 
history.188 The PMOI is a cult-like Iranian group without any real popular support 
in its native country that, prior to the 2003 United States invasion of Iraq, “received 
all of its military assistance and most of its financial support from Saddam 
Hussein.”189 Most outside observers would recognize a distinction between these 
two groups, yet from a legal point of view it is not at all clear which, if any, of the 
two groups’ attributes and histories convinced the government to render judgment 
one way or another. Maybe the fact that the ANC was officially legalized in South 
Africa changed the government’s posture toward it.190 When all political violence 
by nonstate groups is by default illegal, and where the courts refuse to allow 
inquiries into the State Department’s determination of how a group harms national 
security, there is no way of knowing what standards tipped the determination in 
either direction. Even though most observers would be able to view the ANC and 
the PMOI as two completely different types of political movements, both engaged 
in violence that runs afoul of the definition of terrorist activity.191 A serious attempt 
                                                                                                                 
was embarrassed about the situation). 
 187.  See generally ANTHONY SAMPSON, MANDELA: THE AUTHORIZED BIOGRAPHY (2000).  
 188.  A Brief History of the African National Congress, AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS 
(2010), http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?include=docs/misc/2010/umzabalazo.html. The 
pattern of groups condemned as terrorist becoming legitimate political parties in the wake of 
armed conflict is a familiar one. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Safety and Security, 85 NEB. L. 
REV. 454, 489–90 (2006) (“Conversely, we know that many organizations formerly 
condemned as terrorist can become legitimate states, by assuming powers of government and 
using those powers to promote security for all its subjects, rather than using terrorist powers 
to promote the insecurity of, for example, the members of a colonial regime.”). 
 189.  STATE DEPARTMENT TERRORISM REPORT, supra note 152, at 314. 
 190.  Id. The fact that a group is legal where it operates is not a guarantee that it will not 
be listed as an FTO, however. Hizballah, the Lebanese FTO, is an officially recognized 
movement and political party in Lebanon, where several of its members serve in that 
country’s parliament. See id. at 300 (“The Lebanese government and the majority of the 
Arab world, still recognize Hizballah as a legitimate ‘resistance group’ and political party. 
Hizballah has 14 elected officials in the 128-seat Lebanese National Assembly and is 
represented in the Cabinet by the Labor Minister, Mohammed Fneish.”). 
 191.  The fear of regulating terrorism is inconsistent with results in cases involving 
foreign relations, much as the interpretations of the political offense exception to extradition 
in the 1980s generated differing holdings on which individuals were entitled to legal relief 
on that basis, prior to the extradition statute being amended to correct this anomaly. See, e.g., 
United States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491, 492–93, 503 (2d Cir. 1986) (denying government’s 
effort to seek collateral review of magistrate’s denial of extradition request by the United 
Kingdom of IRA member charged with killing a British soldier in Belfast on the basis of the 
political offense exception); Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 507, 522 (7th Cir. 1981) (political 
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to distinguish between the two is in order if an FTO designation is to properly serve 
as the basis for a criminal prosecution.192 Without any standards to govern when a 
group should be deemed terrorist, and therefore subject to designation by “some 
obscure mandarin in the bowels of the State Department,”193 the designation of an 
FTO risks being rendered something akin to an “I know it when I see it” 
standard.194  
c. Selectivity 
A glance at the list of FTOs reveals certain patterns about what, specifically, the 
United States views as a threat. Of the forty-five groups currently listed as FTOs, 
twenty-four are Islamist in orientation, nine are focused on the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict (three of which overlap with the first category), with the remainder being 
assorted groups involved in local conflicts around the globe, most but not all of 
which have some sort of leftist/communist orientation.195 The focus on Islamist 
                                                                                                                 
offense exception not applicable to Palestinian allegedly involved in an attack on a market in 
the Israeli city of Tiberias); United States v. Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 123–24, 137 (2d Cir. 
1981) (denying government’s appeal of magistrate’s denial of extradition request by the 
United Kingdom for an IRA member charged with killing a British soldier in Northern 
Ireland on political offense grounds); Ahmed v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), 
aff’d, 910 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding a Palestinian extraditable to Israel based on 
attack on a bus in the West Bank—the political offense exception to extradition did not 
apply); see also Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 810, 817–18 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that 
target of attack is immaterial to whether offense is political, but allowing extradition based 
on the fact that political uprising in Northern Ireland did not apply to England, the site of the 
IRA’s violent activity). 
 192.  For a considered and nuanced proposal of when certain types of terrorism might be 
justified as “illegal but justifiable” under certain conditions, see Ben Saul, Defending 
“Terrorism”: Justifications and Excuses for Terrorism in International Criminal Law, 25 
AUSTL. YEARBOOK INT’L LAW 177 (2006) (recommending that political violence by a 
nonstate actor be permitted only when 1) it combats serious human rights deprivations, 2) all 
alternatives to violence to change the situation have been exhausted, 3) the group carrying 
out the violence can legitimately claim to represent the people in whose name it acts, 4) the 
purpose of the violence is to replace oppression with freedom, rights protection, and 
democracy, and 5) it must follow international humanitarian law on civilian immunity). 
 193.  United States v. Afshari, 446 F.3d 915, 920 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 194.  Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (referring 
to the legal definition of obscenity). Professor Jeremy Waldron provides a thoughtful 
discussion of standards by which the legitimacy of a nonstate actor might be established. See 
Waldron, supra note 188, at 490 (“If we were wondering about the legitimacy of one of 
these organizations, we would have to ask whether the security of members of its community 
was actually enhanced by its activities . . . [taking] into account not just the benefit to 
members of the relevant community of measures taken against the other paramilitary group, 
but also the effect, both beneficial and detrimental, of measures taken by the organization 
against members of the very community it claimed to be protecting.”). There are of course 
reasons why a government may want to refrain from articulating objective standards. See 
Scharf, supra note 149, at 370–74 (arguing that treating terrorism as the peacetime 
equivalent of a war crime would immunize members of terrorist groups from prosecution for 
attacks on military or police targets). 
 195.  STATE DEPARTMENT TERRORISM REPORT, supra note 152, at 282–84. 
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groups is no surprise, as they represent the threat of the present, with the inclusion 
of leftist/communist groups reminding us of yesterday’s threats. Clearly, the list is 
representative of what the State Department regards as national security threats to 
the United States, since no observer could reasonably argue that these forty-five 
organizations make up the whole or even a majority of the nonstate actors around 
the world engaged in some form of violent political campaign. However, a 
defendant in a § 2339B material support prosecution has virtually no chance of 
succeeding on a theory of selective prosecution, given the impossibly high 
standards accorded such a motion196 and the emphasis placed on stopping terrorist 
crimes.197 
 
*** 
 
The implications of the designation of those groups currently listed as FTOs, 
when viewed in the context of the United States’ overall position on political 
violence by nonstate actors, are far ranging indeed. Collectively, it appears that the 
United States, in articulating its view as to what constitutes a terrorist group, is 
stating that a nonstate actor is presumptively barred from engaging in violence—
except in those rare cases, like that of the ANC, where it can be shown that the 
group is engaged in legitimate resistance to impermissible oppression. In other 
words, the message seems to be that the era of decolonization is over and that the 
state, no matter how oppressive, holds a monopoly on legalized violence. 
Selectivity in the FTO designation process further reveals that, despite the 
presumptive ban on all nonstate political violence, the government believes 
violence is sometimes acceptable under certain circumstances. What is problematic 
is determining when those circumstances occur. Therefore, what is needed is an 
articulation of standards which would allow groups to resist state oppression in 
specific situations.198 Perhaps some groups would never take into account what the 
United States recognizes as legal resistance or proscribes as illegal terrorism, but 
were there clear guidelines, at the very least groups might have an incentive to 
conform their conduct accordingly. 
On the other hand, if the position really is that violence by nonstate actors is 
presumptively terroristic, arguments regarding the justness of an FTO’s cause, 
while not being legally persuasive, have the potential to turn a prosecution into an 
argument over foreign affairs played out in front of a jury. This is most true when 
the link to violent activity and the criminal defendant on trial is remote or even 
nearly non-existent. It is at this point that the debate over standards of personal 
guilt comes into play. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 196.  See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465–66 (1996) (holding that for a 
selective prosecution claim to be successful, a criminal defendant must make a showing that 
the challenged prosecutorial policy had a discriminatory effect and purpose). 
 197.  See United States v. Khan, 461 F.3d 477, 498 (4th Cir. 2006) (“The Executive 
branch has the right to focus its prosecutorial energies on alleged terrorists groups that 
present the most direct threat to the United States and its interests.”). 
 198.  See Shapiro, supra note 103, at 597–98 (making a recommendation that groups be 
given a “road map” that would allow them to be removed from the FTO list, but limiting the 
recommendation to groups that no longer harm American interests). 
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III. SUSTAINING A CONVICTION—PERSONAL GUILT STANDARDS 
The issues of what standards of knowledge and intent are necessary to sustain a 
conviction under § 2339B have been extensively litigated.199 The statutory text and 
legislative history of the statute had, prior to 2004, left out what “knowing” 
provision of material support meant, but addressed the issue of intent, with 
Congress making the explicit statement that “foreign organizations that engage in 
terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to 
such an organization facilitates that conduct.”200 Taken in the context of a 
legislative effort intended to stop the supposed rise in material aid flowing from 
individuals and organizations in the United States to foreign groups involved with 
terrorism under the guise of humanitarian assistance, Congress’s proclamations 
seemed to effect a statutory scheme operating under a strict liability standard for 
those who send money and other forms of proscribed aid to banned terrorist groups, 
irrespective of their knowledge of the group’s status or their intent as to how the aid 
should be used. 
A. “Knowingly” Mens Rea Standard—Humanitarian Law Project 
In Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Department of Justice (HLP II),201 the 
Ninth Circuit addressed the mens rea required to sustain a conviction on § 2339B 
grounds. The case involved several groups and individuals who petitioned for 
declaratory and injunctive relief based on their desire to provide aid to the political 
and humanitarian work carried out by two banned FTOs, the Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party (PKK) and the LTTE.202 In an earlier ruling in the same case, the Ninth 
Circuit upheld the district court’s determination that § 2339B did not violate the 
First Amendment, and as such, did not require a showing of a defendant’s specific 
intent to further the unlawful aims of an FTO to sustain a conviction.203 On the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 199.  See infra Part III.A. 
 200.  Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, § 301, 110 
Stat. 1247 (1996) (making a finding, inter alia, that certain foreign terrorist groups raised 
funds for violent activity in the United States under humanitarian pretenses). This finding 
has been cited with approval by the Supreme Court, as well as several circuit courts. See 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2724, 2729 (2010); United States v. 
Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 329 (4th Cir. 2004), opinion reinstated in part, 405 F.3d 1034 (4th 
Cir. 2005), vacated, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005); Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000, 
1026–27 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Terrorist organizations use funds for illegal activities regardless 
of the intent of the donor, and Congress thus was compelled to attach liability to all 
donations to foreign terrorist organizations.”); Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno (HLP I), 
205 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000). 
  This finding also undergirds another key theory in the ban on material support—the 
fungibility of money, that is, that funds donated to a terrorist group for humanitarian 
purposes free up resources to carry out violent acts. See infra Part III.D.  
 201.  352 F.3d 382 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated as superseded by statute, 393 F.3d 902 (9th 
Cir. 2004). 
 202.  HLP I, 205 F.3d 1130, 1137 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding the material support terms 
“personnel” and “training” void on vagueness grounds). 
 203.  Id. at 1133–36; see also Hammoud, 381 F.3d at 328–29 (rejecting a similar First 
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issue of knowledge, HLP II held that, in keeping with due process concerns of 
personal guilt under the Fifth Amendment, a conviction under § 2339B “require[d] 
proof of knowledge, either of an organization’s designation [as an FTO] or of the 
unlawful activities that caused it to be so designated.”204 The Ninth Circuit derived 
its ruling on the meaning of the term “knowingly” from the principle of statutory 
construction articulated by the Supreme Court that “the presumption in favor of a 
scienter requirement should apply to each of the statutory elements that criminalize 
otherwise innocent conduct.”205 This ruling thus came as a rejection of the 
government’s strict liability position that an individual could be convicted upon the 
mere provision of material support, even without knowledge of the group’s 
designation or terrorist activity.206 In accordance with this ruling, Congress 
subsequently amended § 2339B to read as follows: “[a] person must have 
knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist organization . . . , that the 
organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity . . . , or that the 
organization has engaged or engages in terrorism.”207 
The issue of the required level of intent under Fifth Amendment due process 
principles closely resembles the contours of the debate on § 2339B’s 
constitutionality under the First Amendment. In the latter context, the Supreme 
Court has denied a First Amendment challenge to the statute and refused to read in 
a requirement of specific intent to further the illegal aims of the FTO.208 The debate 
on this same issue in the Fifth Amendment context has been a bit more complicated 
and has not yet been addressed by the Supreme Court. 
B. Specific Intent Mens Rea—United States v. Al-Arian 
In United States v. Al-Arian (“Al-Arian I”), a prosecution involving, inter alia, 
various material support charges against four defendants accused of operating the 
North American cell of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Florida held that, for § 2339B to be 
constitutional, it had to read into the statute a requirement that a defendant have had 
a specific intent to further the illegal aims of the FTO as one of the elements for 
conviction.209 The Al-Arian court’s position on a scienter requirement represents 
the minority view of what constitute the elements of establishing criminal liability 
                                                                                                                 
Amendment challenge). This ruling was ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court. See 
Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2717–18. 
 204.  HLP II, 352 F.3d at 402–03. This standard also underscores the political 
calculations that go into an FTO designation. For example, there may be several Cuban exile 
groups based in the United States that engage in violent activities of similar or greater 
magnitude than groups on the FTO list. While knowing full well their violent activities, an 
individual providing material support to those Cuban groups would never expect the groups 
to be designated as FTOs, largely based on political considerations. 
 205.  United States v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994). 
 206.  HLP II, 352 F.3d at 397. 
 207.  18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2006) (as amended by the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638). 
 208.  See Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2717–18. 
 209.  Al-Arian I, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1335–39 (M.D. Fla. 2004).  
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under § 2339B, as no other court has adopted their holding.210 In the first instance, 
while it adopted the HLP court’s requirement that the defendant know of an FTO’s 
designation or terrorist activities, the court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s 
reluctance to extend the Supreme Court presumption, spelled out in United States v. 
X-Citement Video, of a scienter requirement to the material support element of the 
statute.211 In the court’s opinion, a failure to do so would lead to absurd results. The 
court posited the hypothetical of a cab driver with no connection to an FTO giving 
a ride to an individual he knew to be a member of an FTO as an example of 
imposing criminal liability for what was otherwise innocent conduct.212 Second, the 
court noted that extending the scienter requirement to the material support prong 
allowed § 2339B to be salvaged from a rash of vagueness challenges as to what 
constitutes material support and also avoided the criminalization of innocent 
conduct.213 Even in ruling that a specific intent was necessary, however, the Al-
Arian court was quick to point out that it did not believe it had created an 
insurmountable burden for the government because, for example, “a jury could 
infer a specific intent when a defendant knows that the organization continues to 
commit illegal acts and the defendant provides funds to that organization knowing 
that money is fungible and, once received, the donee can use the funds for any 
purpose it chooses.”214 The court also ended this section of its opinion on a 
somewhat defensive note, albeit one that recalled Congress’s intent in passing 
§ 2339B: “This opinion in no way creates a safe harbor for terrorists or their 
supporters to try and avoid prosecution through utilization of shell ‘charitable 
organizations’ or by directing money through the memo line of a check towards 
lawful activities.”215 
                                                                                                                 
 
 210.  See infra Part III.C. 
 211.  Al-Arian I, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1335–39. 
 212.  Id. at 1337–38. 
 213.  Id. at 1338. The Supreme Court recently upheld the statute in the face of vagueness 
challenges to several of its provisions, despite disparate holdings in the lower courts. See 
Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2718–22, overruling Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey (HLP III), 
552 F.3d 916, 928–30 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding ban on “training,” “service,” and “other 
specialized knowledge” provided as “expert advice or assistance” void for vagueness); 
United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348, 358–59 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding ban on 
“personnel” void for vagueness). But see United States v. Goba (Goba I), 220 F. Supp. 2d 
182, 193–94 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding term “personnel” not unconstitutionally vague based 
on the reasoning of United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 573–77 (E.D. Va. 2002)), 
denying motion for revocation of detention order, 240 F. Supp. 2d 242 (W.D.N.Y. 2003). To 
the extent that “personnel” and “training” were used as tools to prosecute individuals who 
had received military training abroad at the hands of an FTO, in December 2004 Congress 
passed 18 U.S.C. § 2339D as part of IRTPA, which made it a crime to receive such training. 
This new statute presumably does away with those attempts to prosecute individuals who 
received training as materially supporting an FTO by receipt of “training” and “providing” 
themselves as “personnel.” See Chesney, supra note 13, at 58–61, 77–81 (discussing cases 
and recommending a statutory ban on military training at the hands of FTOs). 
 214.  Al-Arian I, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1339. The fungibility of money theory was also 
articulated in the First Amendment context by the opinion in HLP I, 205 F.3d 1130, 1136 
(9th Cir. 2000). This theory is discussed further in Part III.D. 
 215.  Al-Arian I, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1339.  
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The court subsequently expanded on its ruling in denying the government’s 
motion to reconsider the issue of a scienter requirement.216 Specifically, the court 
referenced the Supreme Court’s decision in Scales v. United States, which involved 
the prosecution of an individual charged with unlawful membership in the 
Communist Party, a group that had as one of its aims the overthrow of the United 
States government.217 The court cited the following language from Scales in 
support of its adoption of a specific intent standard in the § 2339B context: 
‘In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when imposition of 
punishment on a status or on conduct can only be justified by reference 
to the relationship of that status or conduct to other concededly 
criminal activity . . . that relationship must be sufficiently substantial to 
satisfy the concept of personal guilt in order to withstand attack under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.’218 
The court reasoned that the Supreme Court’s pronouncement on the topic could 
not be confined only to membership statutes and stated, “[t]he Court held that when 
criminality and punishment are justified by a relationship to others’ conduct, that 
relationship must be sufficiently substantial to constitutionally support criminal 
liability.”219 As with its previous ruling, the court posited a hypothetical of an FTO 
member whose own conduct was entirely innocent but who could be found guilty 
under the statute based on his association with another FTO member engaged in the 
group’s illegal activity.220 The court concluded its opinion by indicating that it 
would be forced to change both its vagueness and First Amendment analyses of 
§ 2339B—implying that all or large sections of the statute would be deemed 
unconstitutional—if it declined to read in the specific intent requirement it 
proposed.221 
                                                                                                                 
 
 216.  See United States v. Al-Arian (Al-Arian II), 329 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1298–1300 
(M.D. Fla. 2004). 
 217.  Id. at 1299–1300 (citing Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 205–06 (1961)). 
 218.  Id. at 1299 (alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (quoting Scales, 367 U.S. 
at 224–25). 
 219.  Id. at 1300. 
 220.  Id. 
 221.  Id. at 1300–05. The court also reiterated its statement that the specific intent 
requirement should not hinder the government’s anti-terrorism efforts, nor should it create a 
“safe harbor” for terrorists. Id. at 1305. The court also wavered somewhat in ruling that the 
material support provided was with the knowledge that the recipient “could or would utilize 
the support to further the illegal activities of the entity.” Id. at 1298 (emphasis added). By 
contrast, its prior ruling in Al-Arian I simply established that the specific intent requirement 
mandated that the support provided “would further the illegal activities” of the FTO. Al-
Arian I, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1339 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (emphasis added). In the end, the 
court’s jury instruction on the material support charges left the standard at “would.” Jury 
Instruction No. 25 at 42, United States v. Al-Arian, No. 8:03-CR-77-T-30-TBM (M.D. Fla. 
Nov. 15, 2005), ECF No. 1431. 
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C. Al-Arian’s Rulings Rejected 
The only other court to adopt a specific intent requirement in the § 2339B 
context occurred in the case of United States v. Al-Hussayen, a District of Idaho 
case in which a Saudi graduate student at the University of Idaho was charged with 
providing material support to a banned FTO via his administration of various 
websites.222 Since the Al-Arian decisions were issued, a growing number of courts 
have directly refuted their holdings by issuing opinions finding that due process 
personal guilt concerns do not mandate a specific intent requirement to further the 
illegal activities of an FTO under the statute.223 Each court’s decision employs 
similar reasoning and makes a number of separate points, which run as follows. 
With respect to the Al-Arian court’s reliance on the holding in Scales, the statute 
at issue in the latter case dealt directly with the issue of membership, thereby 
threatening legally protected association or membership but not the affirmative 
conduct of providing material support to a banned organization.224 In this regard, 
the requirement that a defendant know that the group being supported was an FTO 
or engaged in terrorist activity suffices to meet any due process personal guilt 
concerns.225 Congress recognized this reasoning in late 2004 when it purposefully 
added such a knowledge requirement via the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act (IRTPA) but pointedly declined to make any mention of a specific 
                                                                                                                 
 
 222.  See Alan F. Williams, Prosecuting Website Development Under the Material 
Support to Terrorism Statutes: Time to Fix What’s Broken, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. 
POL’Y 365, 367–73 (2008); see also Jury Instruction No. 37 at 40, United States v. Al-
Hussayen, No. CR03-048-C-EJL (D. Idaho June 1, 2004), ECF No. 660. The defendant was 
ultimately acquitted on the material support charges. Williams, supra, at 378. Judge Roger 
Gregory of the Fourth Circuit also adopted the Al-Arian court’s reading of § 2339B in his 
dissenting opinion in United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 376–81 (4th Cir. 2004) 
(Gregory, J., dissenting), vacated, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005). 
 223.  See, e.g., HLP III, 552 F.3d 916, 924–27 (9th Cir. 2007), aff’d in part, 130 S. Ct. 
2705 (2010); United States v. Taleb-Jedi, 566 F. Supp. 2d 157, 177–80 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); 
United States v. Warsame, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1020–22 (D. Minn. 2008); United States v. 
Assi, 414 F. Supp. 2d 707, 719–24 (E.D. Mich. 2006); United States v. Paracha, No. 03 CR 
1197(SHS), 2006 WL 12768, at *25–30 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2006), aff’d, 313 F. App’x 347 (2d 
Cir. 2008); Linde v. Arab Bank, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 585–87 & n.11 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); 
United States v. Marzook, 383 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1068–70 (N.D. Ill. 2005). For an extended 
discussion of Scales, see Chesney, supra note 13, at 66–71; David H. Pendle, Comment, 
Charity of the Heart and Sword: The Material Support Offense and Personal Guilt, 30 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 777, 786–802 (2007); Benjamin Yaster, Note, Resetting Scales: An 
Examination of Due Process Rights in Material Support Prosecutions, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1353 (2008). 
 224.  See Paracha, 2006 WL 12768 at *26–27 (citing Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 
203, 205 (1961) (discussing the Smith Act as compared to 18 U.S.C. § 2339B)). 
 225.  See HLP III, 552 F.3d at 925, 927; Marzook, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 1070 (“[A]s 
Defendant points out, a donor could contribute material support with impunity to any 
number of organizations that engage in ‘terrorist’ activity, so long as the Secretary of State 
has not designated the recipient a ‘foreign terrorist organization.’ Thus, the criminalizing 
fact—the fact that separates innocent conduct from criminal—is that the individual provided 
material support to an organization that has been designated an FTO.” (emphasis in 
original)). 
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intent requirement in the wake of the Al-Arian decisions.226 That the Ninth Circuit 
also declined to adopt a scienter requirement regarding material support—as 
opposed to the FTO designation—further militates in support of this position.227 A 
scienter requirement is further contradicted by the fact that Congress enacted 
§ 2339B to close the loophole left open by § 2339A, which allowed for the 
continued flow of aid to terrorist groups under the guise of humanitarian or 
charitable activity. Congress also stated that the purpose of § 2339B was to end this 
phenomenon, regardless of donor’s intent.228 Congress took these actions after 
hearing testimony from advocates who urged it to adopt a specific intent standard. 
The advocates feared that without such a standard, § 2339B would chill donations 
of aid by American Muslims, who have a religious obligation to give a certain 
amount of their income as charity on a yearly basis—a point that serves only to 
strengthen the argument against the scienter requirement.229 
D. The Limits of “Money Is Fungible” 
Academic commentators have divided on what personal guilt standard should 
govern in material support prosecutions under § 2339B.230 The application of the 
law is less controversial when it is used to prosecute individuals engaged in 
activities that are much more likely to fund violence. For example, when an 
individual is charged with supporting Al-Qaeda, the link between material support 
and violence is strong because the goals of the organization are all violent.231 The 
                                                                                                                 
 
 226.  HLP III, 552 F.3d at 927. 
 227.  Id. at 925 (“In December 2004, Congress passed IRTPA that revised AEDPA to 
essentially adopt our reading of AEDPA section 2339B to include a knowledge 
requirement.”).  
 228.  See id.; Paracha, 2006 WL 12768 at *28; Marzook, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 1070. 
 229.  See Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1146 (C.D. Cal. 
2005) (citing Comprehensive Antiterrorism Act of 1995: Hearing on H.R. 1710 Before the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 316 (1995) (statement of Gregory T. Nojeim, 
Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union); Comprehensive Antiterrorism Act of 
1995: Hearing on H.R. 1710 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 440 (1995) 
(statement of Azizah Y. Al-Hibri, Ph.D., National Advisory Board, American Muslim 
Council); Comprehensive Antiterrorism Act of 1995: Hearing on H.R. 1710 Before the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 420 (1995) (statement of Khalil E. Jahshan, Executive 
Director, National Association of Arab Americans)). 
 230.  See Abrams, supra note 87, at 21 (recommending the adoption of a knowledge plus 
substantial aid standard for criminal liability under § 2339B); Chesney, supra note 13, at 84–
85 (recommending the adoption of, inter alia, a recklessness standard as a lesser state of 
culpability for those without the requisite specific intent to further an FTO’s illegal 
activities); David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and 
War, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 724–25 (2009) [hereinafter Cole, Out of the Shadows] 
(advocating a specific intent standard); Pendle, supra note 223, at 778–79 (recommending a 
recklessness standard); see also Sahar Aziz, Note, The Laws on Providing Material Support 
to Terrorist Organizations: The Erosion of Constitutional Rights or a Legitimate Tool for 
Preventing Terrorism?, 9 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 45, 89 (2003) (recommending a specific intent 
standard). 
 231.  David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 38 
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true challenge in the law’s use lies in prosecuting individuals when (1) they are 
charged with supporting legitimate charitable activities, which, but for the group’s 
designation, would be completely lawful, and (2) the charged individuals have no 
connection to violent activity. 
The theory underpinning such prosecutions is the idea that money is fungible. 
Take this prominent and often-cited passage from HLP I, which states: 
[A]ll material support given to such organizations aids their unlawful 
goals. Indeed, as the government points out, terrorist organizations do 
not maintain open books. Therefore, when someone makes a donation 
to them, there is no way to tell how the donation is used. Further, as 
amicus Anti-Defamation League notes, even contributions earmarked 
                                                                                                                 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 14 (2003) [hereinafter Cole, The New McCarthyism] (“An 
organization like Al Qaeda may present a special case, for it does not appear to have legal 
purposes at all. Unlike, say, the Irish Republican Army, the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization, or the ANC, groups with political agendas that use violent means among many 
others, Al Qaeda appears to do little more than plot, train for, and conduct terrorism. But if 
that is the case, we do not need guilt by association. It ought to be relatively simple to 
establish that when an individual affirmatively supports Al Qaeda, he intends to support its 
terrorist ends, because Al Qaeda has few if any other ends.”); see e.g., United States v. 
Warsame, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1015 (D. Minn. 2008) (“Al Qaeda is not a political 
advocacy group.”). 
  The link between material support and violence is true both when individuals go to 
trial and when they plead guilty, even when the plea does not reference Al-Qaeda. See 
United States v. Arnaout (Arnaout II), 431 F.3d 994, 1002–03 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding that a 
statute on promoting or aiding terrorism applied broadly to activities involved in promoting 
terrorism crimes), aff’d, 323 F. App’x 458 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Faris, 388 F.3d 
452, 457–58 (4th Cir. 2004) (upholding denial of motion to withdraw plea of materially 
supporting Al-Qaeda by attending military training camp), vacated, 544 U.S. 916 (2005); 
United States v. Ali, No. CRIM.A.1:05-53, 2006 WL 1102835, at *3–4 (E.D. Va. Apr. 17, 
2006) (materially supporting Al-Qaeda), rev’d, 528 F.3d 210 (4th Cir. 2008); United States 
v. Khan, 309 F. Supp. 2d 789, 820 (E.D. Va. 2004) (conspiracy to provide material support 
to Al-Qaeda), aff’d, 461 F.3d 477 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Goba (Goba II), 240 F. 
Supp. 2d 242, 244 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (denying bail to “Lackawanna Six” defendants, who 
were charged with materially supporting Al-Qaeda on the basis of attending training camps 
in Afghanistan run by the group); United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 545–46 (E.D. 
Va. 2002) (summarizing allegations); Superseding Indictment at 3–4, United States v. Hayat, 
No. 05-240 GEB (E.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2005); Eric Lichtblau, Charity Leader Accepts a Deal 
in a Terror Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2003, at A1 (describing Arnaout’s plea in which he 
denied all links to Al-Qaeda, despite the government’s insistence that he served as a major 
financier of Osama Bin Laden and noting that hearsay linking Arnaout to Al-Qaeda was held 
inadmissible by the court); Jerry Markon, “Va. Jihad” Case Hailed as Key in War on 
Terror, WASH. POST, June 8, 2006, at A03 (describing the “paintball” case, a prosecution of 
American Muslims accused of training to fight with Lashkar-i-Taiba, a banned FTO, which 
contained allegations of conspiracy to materially support terrorists); Press Release, U.S. 
Department of Justice, United States Attorney Eastern District of Virginia (Apr. 26, 2005), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/vae/Pressreleases/04-AprilPDFArchive/05/ 
42605TimimiPR.pdf (detailing Ali Al-Timimi’s conviction for attempting to aid the Taliban, 
among other things); see also Mark Arax, The Agent Who Might Have Saved Hamid Hayat, 
L.A. TIMES, May 28, 2006, I.16 (Magazine), at 16 (reporting jury’s verdict of guilty as to 
Hamid and declaration of a mistrial as to his father).  
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for peaceful purposes can be used to give aid to the families of those 
killed while carrying out terrorist acts, thus making the decision to 
engage in terrorism more attractive. More fundamentally, money is 
fungible; giving support intended to aid an organization’s peaceful 
activities frees up resources that can be used for terrorist acts. We will 
not indulge in speculation about whether Congress was right to come to 
the conclusion that it did. We simply note that Congress has the fact-
finding resources to properly come to such a conclusion. Thus, we 
cannot say that AEDPA is not sufficiently tailored.232 
Based on the Congressional record, the assertion that terrorist groups operate in 
a monolithic manner, to the degree that a dollar sent for peaceful or humanitarian 
activities frees up a dollar for violence, is questionable in and of itself.233 However, 
even assuming that the factual assertions behind the “money is fungible” theory are 
correct, § 2339B prosecutions, when raising the specter of despised and demonized 
terrorist groups, can threaten to take the theory well beyond even the outer limits of 
what is constitutional, thereby risking turning the courtroom into an arena for a 
referendum on questions of foreign policy.234 
                                                                                                                 
 
 232.  205 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). See United States 
v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 381, 329 (4th Cir. 2004), vacated, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005), and United 
States v. Marzook, 383 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1068 (N.D. Ill. 2005), for examples of later cases 
quoting HLP I. See also United States v. Al-Arian, 280 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1351 (M.D. Fla. 
2003) (“Thus, while these Defendants did not plan the attacks, the government argues they 
supported them, applauded the PIJ’s tactics, promoted its activities and organization, raised 
monies to fund its terror operations, and gave succor to the families of bombers in order to 
encourage a policy designed to entice new human weapons.”). 
  For similar reasoning in the context of a civil case construing the same statutory 
scheme, see Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 698 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(“If Hamas budgets $2 million for terrorism and $2 million for social services and receives a 
donation of $100,000 for those services, there is nothing to prevent its using that money for 
them while at the same time taking $100,000 out of its social services ‘account’ and 
depositing it in its terrorism ‘account.’ . . . Anyone who knowingly contributes to the 
nonviolent wing of an organization that he knows to engage in terrorism is knowingly 
contributing to the organization’s terrorist activities.”), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 458 (2009). 
 233.  Professor David Cole has been the most consistent and thorough critic of the 
material support ban in both his academic writings and legal advocacy. See Cole, The New 
McCarthyism, supra note 231, at 12 (“The legislative history of the material support law 
contains not one word of testimony about even a single terrorist organization’s finances, 
much less all ‘foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity.’ A congressional 
‘finding’ that ‘domestic political parties that engage in illegal conduct are so tainted by their 
criminal conduct that any contribution facilitates that conduct’ surely would not authorize 
imposing guilt by association on support of domestic groups. . . . [I]t simply does not follow 
that all organizations that use or threaten to use violence will turn any donation that supports 
their lawful activities into money for terrorism.”). 
 234.  See, e.g., Rudolph Bush & Azam Ahmed, Hamas Suspects Defended, CHI. TRIB., 
Jan. 11, 2007, Metro, at 1 (“Wednesday's arguments by the defense attorneys were steeped 
in the history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the hardships they say the Palestinians 
have endured. . . . Ashqar’s attorney, William Moffitt, compared the struggle of Palestinians 
to historic fights against repression, from the American Revolution to the civil rights 
movement. He showed jurors a mock ‘wanted’ poster charging George Washington with 
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1. The Holy Land Foundation Prosecution 
 
a. Background 
The paradigmatic case of the “money is fungible” theory is the prosecution of 
the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF). HLF, a 501(c)(3) 
nonprofit headquartered in Texas, was first designated by the Treasury 
Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) as a Specially Designated 
Global Terrorist in December 2001 on the basis that HLF raised and sent funds to 
Hamas, which itself had been previously designated as a terrorist organization by 
an executive order.235 The designation had the effect of freezing all of HLF’s 
assets, essentially shutting down its entire operation.236 In announcing HLF’s 
designation, President Bush directly linked violent acts by Hamas to money raised 
by HLF in the United States for purportedly humanitarian goals and highlighted 
that where money did not go directly to fund violence, it was used for purposes of 
terrorist indoctrination.237 HLF petitioned for relief from the designation on the 
grounds that OFAC did not consider all available evidence and that it was 
prevented from submitting evidence in its own defense.238 However, the trial court 
rejected HLF’s arguments and let stand the designation and the asset freeze, since, 
under the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) principles of limited review, 
OFAC’s administrative record was binding on the court and could not be 
challenged.239 Based on the administrative record, the court proceeded to reject 
HLF’s APA and constitutional claims, even though the group objected to the 
government’s use of foreign-derived evidence to support its designation, as well as 
what it deemed faulty translations and fundamental misconceptions of, for 
example, what the definition of the word “martyr” connotes; the government had 
contended that HLF’s support of families of martyrs meant individuals who died in 
                                                                                                                 
terrorism.”); Michael Fechter, Defense: Al-Arian Exercised His Rights, TAMPA TRIB., Nov. 
9, 2005, Nation/World, at 1 (“It’s not a conflict, countered Linda Moreno, Al-Arian’s other 
defense attorney. It’s a war. And the brutal reality of occupation must be discussed to place 
Al-Arian’s actions in context. ‘If we wish to be free, we must fight,’ she said, quoting 
Patrick Henry. . . . ‘This is not a criminal case’ . . . . ‘This is a political case.”). 
 235.  Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 64 (D.D.C. 
2002), aff’d in relevant part, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003). It later surfaced that HLF was 
first implicated as a source of funds for Hamas based on statements made by Muhammad 
Salah, a Palestinian American under interrogation by agents of Israel’s General Security 
Services. See Jason Trahan, Holy Land Investigation Dates Back to 1993, DALL. MORNING 
NEWS, Nov. 25, 2008. For more on Salah’s case and his allegations of torture by Israel’s 
General Security Services, see Wadie E. Said, Coercing Voluntariness, 85 IND. L.J. 1, 34–42 
(2010). 
 236.  See Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 219 F. Supp. 2d at 64. 
 237.  Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, President Announces 
Progress on Financial Fight Against Terror (Dec. 4, 2001), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011204-8.html (stating that funds raised 
by HLF were “used by Hamas to support schools and indoctrinate children to grow up into 
suicide bombers” and to “recruit suicide bombers and to support their families”). 
 238.  Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 219 F. Supp. 2d at 65. 
 239.  Id. at 65, 66 n.7.  
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the commission of violent acts on behalf of Hamas, while HLF disputed that 
characterization.240 
b. Criminal Prosecution 
On July 26, 2004, HLF and several of its former officers and directors were 
indicted on charges of, inter alia, conspiracy to provide material support to Hamas 
in violation of § 2339B, as well as on various substantive material support 
counts.241 Critical to the government’s case were allegations that the defendants had 
financed Hamas via a series of zakat242 committees—that is, local Palestinian 
organizations that collect charitable donations on behalf of the needy, which were 
really fronts for Hamas.243 The indictment originally alleged that the money the 
HLF sent to the zakat committees was “collected externally under humanitarian 
banners [and] routed to military and operational use, in addition to freeing up other 
funds for specific terrorist acts.”244 However, at trial, the government retreated from 
this position, arguing that the committees, which were not designated terrorist 
groups, were controlled entirely or partially by Hamas and that the legitimate 
humanitarian aid they provided generated support for the organization within the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip.245 This position represented a departure from the 
“money is fungible” theory. Instead of arguing that HLF’s humanitarian donations 
were fungible, the government argued that HLF’s humanitarian donations 
strengthened Hamas’s image, presumably winning the group new recruits and 
community support.246 
In addition to the extensive evidence presented regarding the legitimate and 
much needed humanitarian aid the HLF delivered, the jury heard evidence that 
several of the zakat committees the government named had received aid from the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, the United States Agency for 
International Development, the European Commission, and various United Nations 
agencies.247 Further, the jury heard testimony from the former consul general of the 
U.S. Consulate General in Jerusalem,248 the second-highest-ranking intelligence 
official in the State Department, that he received daily briefings from the CIA that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 240.  Id. at 66–84. 
 241.  Superseding Indictment, United States v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 
3:04-CR-240-G (N.D. Tex. July 26, 2004). 
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 243.  Id. 
 244.  Id. 
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http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/humanrights/blockingfaith.pdf. 
 246.  Id. 
 247.  Id. at 62. 
 248.  See DEPARTMENT OF STATE, CONSULATE GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, JERUSALEM, 
ABOUT THE CONSULATE, available at http://jerusalem.usconsulate.gov/about_the_embassy.html 
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Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza.”). 
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never mentioned Hamas control of the zakat committees, which he had personally 
visited on several occasions.249 On October 22, 2007, three months after it began, 
the first trial ended after the judge declared a mistrial following the jury’s inability 
to reach a verdict on many of the charges against all defendants.250 The jury 
returned no convictions and several partial acquittals.251 
On November 24, 2008, after a retrial in which the parties presented essentially 
the same arguments, the HLF defendants were convicted on all charges.252 While 
there were a few differences between the trials,253 the government’s case tying the 
zakat committees to Hamas came down to an Israeli intelligence officer testifying 
anonymously that such a link existed.254 The HLF trial marked the second time in a 
federal prosecution that a foreign intelligence agent was allowed to testify under a 
pseudonym,255 but the trial was unique in that the agent was allowed to do so as an 
expert witness, with all the attendant testimonial privileges such a status entails.256 
The intelligence officer, in his capacity as an expert, was permitted to testify that 
documents seized in military raids, which the defense was not allowed to see, as 
well as “unauthored and unsigned” documents purportedly from the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization, linked the zakat committees to Hamas.257 The prosecution 
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anonymous expert witness during the retrial in 2008). 
 255.  The first case was the Abu Marzook prosecution in the Northern District of Illinois 
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 256.  Trahan, Israeli Secret Agent, supra note 254 (“What makes Avi’s testimony 
particularly groundbreaking is that he may be the first person in the U.S. legal system 
allowed to testify as an expert witness under an assumed name. U.S. District Judge A. Joe 
Fish certified him as such after a hearing Monday. ‘I’ve never heard of an expert witness 
being granted anonymity from the defense,’ said Southern Methodist University assistant 
law professor Jeffrey Kahn[.] ‘The way you assess an expert’s reliability and relevance is 
through his reputation, his writings, his professional experiences. How could you possibly 
impeach this witness, let alone test whether jurors should trust his opinions, without knowing 
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permitting anonymous testimony by foreign agents in a criminal trial, see Said, supra note 
235, at 31. 
 257.  See Bob Ray Sanders, Convictions Mark a Sad Day for America, FORT WORTH 
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of HLF, formerly the largest Muslim charity in the United States, also featured the 
publication of a list of unindicted co-conspirators, which included the largest and 
most prominent American Muslim umbrella organizations and advocacy groups.258 
Making the list public has had the effect of chilling and discouraging dealings with 
the groups and individuals named as unindicted co-conspirators.259 In total, the net 
effect of the prosecution and subsequent conviction of the HLF defendants has 
contributed to the criminalization of charitable donations to the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip.260  
c. Implications and Repercussions 
Given that a central truism underpinning § 2339B’s ban on material support is 
the idea that money to charity frees up money for violence, it is perhaps not 
surprising, however inhumane, to criminalize charitable activity when it can be 
reasonably linked to terrorist violence. The real question is how to credibly link the 
charitable activity with violence. The government’s theory of prosecution in HLF 
was predicated on the alleged link between Hamas and the zakat committees, 
which, it alleged, did not in fact free up money for violence but essentially served 
as a useful propagandistic tool for Hamas.261 
Even assuming the validity of this propagandistic theory, the evidence 
supporting it was troubling in several respects. First, the language of the indictment 
highlighted the zakat committees in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in their entirety 
as acting on behalf of Hamas’s charitable network.262 All zakat committees are 
charged as being part of a terrorist network, thereby rendering all Muslim 
charitable giving in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as inherently suspect. This is far 
too broad of an allegation, with obvious negative consequences for religiously 
observant Muslims wanting to provide for Palestinian humanitarian 
requirements.263 
Second, the evidence tying the zakat committees to Hamas was both speculative 
and questionable. The intelligence agent expert witness was basically 
unaccountable in what he said on two fronts. His identity was unknown, and it is 
impossible to investigate an individual whose identity one does not know. Even if 
his identity were known and a subsequent investigation revealed that he perjured 
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himself at trial, as a foreign citizen, U.S. courts would have no ability to compel his 
presence here to face any perjury-related charges.264  
Perhaps more significant is the notion of what standards render a charitable 
institution part of an FTO. The legislative record in support of § 2339B’s passage 
imagines an integrated terrorist movement, with a violent wing and a charitable 
wing of inextricably linked finances.265 But one can reasonably ask what standards 
justify declaring charitable groups as part of or controlled by an FTO. In this case, 
would one Hamas member on the board of a zakat committee presumptively make 
its activities material support of terrorism? If not, what is the magic number of 
members? Are there situations where a zakat committee could have no Hamas 
members on its board or staff, yet still provide banned material support? Could a 
group have a large number of Hamas members involved with it and still not fall 
afoul of the ban? It seems that in the absence of any standards, relying on a hostile 
intelligence agent testifying under a pseudonym to answer these questions in a self-
serving manner is a dubious basis for drawing the link to a banned FTO.266  
Finally, there is the question of designating the zakat committees at issue. The 
government did not designate them as terrorist organizations in advance of trial.267 
In contrast, in Al-Arian, a similar case involving allegations of material support to 
an FTO but no allegations of direct links to violent activity, the government felt it 
had sufficient evidence of a charity serving as a front for an FTO and had the 
Treasury Department designate the charity as a front for an FTO.268 Even if the 
designation would not serve any prosecutorial goal in the HLF case, it would signal 
that the government views the committees as inextricably linked to Hamas and 
underscore the seriousness of the verdict. That it has not done so at least leaves 
open the possibility that the zakat committees are not an urgent target of United 
States counterterrorism efforts and may not really be linked to promoting 
terrorism.269 
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 269.  An amicus brief filed on behalf of the HLF defendants in support of their appeal 
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A review of the HLF prosecution reveals not so much a criminal case, but an 
argument about United States foreign policy. The trial itself signifies that, 
ultimately, when the government brings allegations of material support without a 
direct or significant link to violence, the stage is set for an extended discussion of 
foreign policy within the courtroom. Once all a defendant’s legal challenges to the 
material support law have been defeated, with nothing left to litigate, his or her 
only recourse is to make arguments rooted in politics. The HLF prosecution 
featured extensive testimony and evidentiary exhibits as to the defendants’ political 
views on Hamas and Israel, all of which were engineered to demonstrate 
knowledge of the illegal nature of the contributions to the zakat committees.270 This 
was true of the other two major federal prosecutions that sounded in similar 
allegations of providing aid to banned Palestinian FTOs on a “money is fungible” 
theory, Al-Arian and Abu Marzook.271 Why those prosecutions produced acquittals 
on the major terrorism charges and HLF did not is not easily explained.272 
Defendants in § 2339B prosecutions have repeatedly argued for a specific intent 
standard to be adopted, but they have been unsuccessful. Leaving to one side the 
moral arguments about the criminalization of material support for humanitarian aid 
in areas where an FTO controls its distribution, it is unrealistic to expect that a 
specific intent requirement will be adopted. The plaintiffs in the HLP litigation 
have repeatedly tried to carve out an exception to § 2339B’s strictures, both on 
humanitarian grounds and on the basis of trying to steer an FTO away from 
terrorism.273 Those efforts have failed as well, most recently at the Supreme Court, 
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with the stated rationale being that it would be far too easy for terrorists to divert 
humanitarian funds to violence one way or another and, as a result, needlessly 
impede United States counterterrorism efforts.274  
While the debate in academia and litigation regarding the proper personal guilt 
standards raises important and valid points,275 an effective safeguard needs to be 
enacted to prevent the “money is fungible” theory from being used to criminalize 
humanitarian aid that does not free up resources for violence. The HLF prosecution 
serves as the prime example of this trend in action.276 Prosecuting individuals 
criminally on such a basis under the knowledge standard does not meet the Scales 
Fifth Amendment due process standards.277 It is therefore time for the government 
to put the “money is fungible” theory to the test in litigation. Where the 
government makes allegations that humanitarian aid is being sent to an FTO, it 
should have to show how money or other material support frees up resources for 
violence on a structural and organizational basis. In the case of groups that have 
only violent or illegal goals, this should be relatively easy. Where groups are more 
multifaceted and complex, to the point where resources for charity may very well 
not free up resources for violence, the government needs to make a stronger 
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showing that goes beyond illustrating mere enhancement of the group’s image in 
the community in which it operates. This is less complicated than it seems. The 
government would need to show that there is some link between an FTO and the 
charity in question—for example, a joint bank account, FTO members involved 
with a charity in a certain capacity, or the FTO advertising its link with a charity. 
Linking to an FTO a nebulous series of ostensibly unrelated entities under a 
heading that implicates core religious obligations—zakat committees—cannot 
suffice to ground a conviction when the charity is established as legitimate. 
Without such a showing, a § 2339B prosecution risks violating the due process 
rights of a defendant, while at the same time turning the trial into a political 
argument over foreign policy. 
Criminal prosecution for providing material support to an FTO translates the 
consequences of being on a list into direct action, effectively putting an FTO on 
notice that its members and supporters are fair game. When the link to violence—
let alone violence against the United States—is attenuated and indirect, a § 2339B 
prosecution has little to do with United States national security, and it has much 
more to do with its foreign policy. A terrorism prosecution, much like commerce, 
diplomacy, or military action, thereby becomes a vehicle for United States foreign 
policy. If the government does not challenge that the money was sent for 
humanitarian purposes, it ordinarily attempts to demonstrate why the FTO has been 
designated as a terrorist organization, which it can do most directly by presenting 
evidence of violent attacks, in order to convince a jury of the FTO’s 
dangerousness.278 This in turn legitimates an inquiry into a defendant’s motivations 
behind the support. In situations where there is a valid humanitarian need for 
charitable contributions, a defendant can argue that United States foreign policy, in 
criminalizing charity, is unjust. Courts are not designed to engage in a referendum 
on American foreign policy, but § 2339B prosecutions illustrate how such 
referenda may take place, where a defendant has no other choice but to make a 
political argument. 
The stakes involved cannot be underestimated when one takes into account what 
a sentence for a conviction on § 2339B charges can look like.279 In the HLF case, 
the sentences ranged from fifteen to sixty-five years.280 In the case of Mohammed 
al-Moayad, a Yemeni sheikh, and Mohammed Zayed, his assistant, the defendants 
were given sentences of seventy-five years and forty-five years, respectively, on 
account of charitable contributions to Hamas, despite the weakness and 
inflammatory nature of the evidence.281 Mohamad Hammoud, a Lebanese national, 
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was given a sentence of 155 years for providing material support to Hizballah, 
despite doubts about the sufficiency of the evidence against him.282 When 
contrasted with the sentence that al-Marri, the convicted al-Qaeda sleeper agent, 
was set to receive, the sentences meted out in the HLF case can seem excessive, 
and at the very least reveal the seriousness of a conviction on § 2339B grounds. 
 
*** 
 
The debate over satisfying Fifth Amendment due process concerns in the 
§ 2339B context has settled into a pattern, with courts generally upholding 
Congress’s intent to enact a knowledge standard. While academic commentary on 
the issue has been varied and diverse, those courts examining the statute have 
accepted the “money is fungible” theory as a normatively correct basis for 
proceeding with a prosecution. However, the further the government strays from 
showing a link between material support and violence, the more difficult it 
becomes to justify use of the theory on personal guilt due process grounds. 
Additionally, as the designation debate has demonstrated, the further the link from 
violence, the more likely it is that a prosecution will turn into a battle over the 
correctness or justness of United States foreign policy. On a policy basis, it would 
probably be best for the government to refrain from bringing prosecutions like that 
of HLF, where the link to violence is remote at best, given that these prosecutions 
have the capacity to turn the courtroom into an arena for a foreign policy debate.283 
Legally, without a stronger evidentiary showing, the “money is fungible” theory 
risks erroneously convicting individuals who are charged with charitable activity 
on behalf of a despised FTO. 
CONCLUSION 
Historically, the terrorism trial concerned itself with acts of violence with a 
United States nexus. In such a case, an inquiry as to underlying foreign policy was 
not legitimate, since what was being criminalized was actual violence. As the 
terrorism prosecution post-9/11 has focused on conduct further removed from 
violent activity, the question of what standards allow a group to be classified as 
terrorist becomes more relevant. When all nonstate violence can be deemed 
terrorist, it is legitimate to require the government to articulate standards for groups 
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to follow if they are to overcome their designated FTO status. While this may seem 
unrealistic, if the United States were to articulate such standards, the standards 
would make a significant contribution to clarifying when and under what 
circumstances the use of political violence might be permissible. Perhaps doing so 
would not be politically expedient, but it is necessary in light of the fact that 
designations serve as the basis for most of the significant terrorism prosecutions. In 
addition, the government should be required to set forth its evidentiary basis for 
how support for charity frees up resources for violence, especially in those cases 
with a serious humanitarian aspect. Otherwise, without such an evidentiary 
showing, the government risks cynically criminalizing humanitarian aid in zones 
where it is genuinely needed and guarantees the transformation of a § 2339B 
prosecution into a trial on foreign policy grounds. 
